Pisqa’ 269345H:263-265;JN2:206-210 1. “In the event that she doesn’t please him” (Dt.24:1). On this basis: The circle of Shammai would say: A man should not divorce his wife unless he finds her lewd, as it is stated: “And he found in her a lewd thing” (`ervat davar;346For more on this term, cf. Pisqa’ 254.2-3Dt.24:1). But the circle of Hillel say: Even if she burned his dinner, as it is stated: “And he found in her a lewd thing” (Dt.24:1).347= M. Git. 9:10.
2. Said the circle of Hillel To the circle of Shammai: If thing (davar) is said in the verse, what is the purpose of lewd (`ervat)? But, if lewd is said, what is the purpose of thing? For if thing [alone] had been stated without the addition of lewd, I might have thought: A woman who is expelled over a thing should be permitted to remarry, but one expelled because she is lewd, shouldn’t be permitted to remarry. So, don’t be surprised! If she is prohibited [by her lewdness] from marrying a man who would normally be permitted to her, shouldn’t she be prohibited to one who is normally prohibited to her? The Teaching states: “A lewd thing. . . and he shall send her from his house, so she can go out and be with another man” (Dt.24:1-2)— [thus, the addition of lewd actually gives the woman an option to remarry]. And, likewise, if lewd [alone] had been stated without the addition of thing, I might have thought: A woman who is lewd should be expelled, but one who fails to satisfy in a thing shouldn’t be expelled. The Teaching states: “A lewd thing . . . and he shall send her from his house.” (Dt.24:1-2)— [thus, the addition of thing reinforces a husband’s option to end the marriage].
R. Akiva says: Even if he found a prettier one [a husband may divorce his wife,] for it is stated: “In the event that she doesn’t please him” (Dt.24:1).348=M. Git. 9:10.
3. “Then he shall have written for her” (Dt.24:1)— specifically in her name. On this basis they taught: Any document of divorce not written in the name of a specific woman is invalid. How so? He was passing in the street {and heard the voice of scribes reading copy, saying: The gentleman, So-and-So, divorces the lady, So-and-So, from Such-and-Such a place. And he thought: This is my name, and that’s my wife’s name! This is an invalid notice of divorce.}349= M. Git. 3:1. The bracketed text fills in a scribal lacuna on the basis of the mishnaic text and the critical apparatus of F:288, l. 15.
“Written” (Dt.24:1)— I might only infer that it be written in black ink. How do I know that it can be written with pigment, with red ink, with pine-gum ink, or with vitriol? The Teaching states: “Written” (Dt.24:1)— with anything [making a permanent mark].350Cf. T.Git.2:3.
“A document”351Heb: sefer. In biblical and rabbinic texts, sefer generally refers to a text of some importance preserved on a scroll and archived in a safe place. (Dt.24:1)— I might infer only that it must be written on a parchment-scroll [like a scriptural text]. How do I know that it may even be written on leaves of reeds, nuts, olives, and carob? The Teaching states: “He places it in her hand” (Dt.24:1)— whatever it may be [written on]. Well, if so, why does [the verse] specify a document [in the form of a scroll]? Just as a scroll is distinctive for its durability, any material lacking durability is excluded [from the rule]. R. Judah b. Betyra says: Just as a scroll is distinctive in being detached from the ground, any writing surface attached to the ground is excluded [from the rule].352// T. Git.2:3; cf. M.Git.2:4.
4. “Writ of separation” (Dt.24:1)— it must effect a separation [between the two parties]. On this basis you can teach— One who says to his wife: Here is your divorce-document— on condition that you never again visit your father’s house; On condition that you’ll never again drink wine— this is not a complete separation [since the stated condition enables the husband to control his ex-wife’s activities after the divorce]. On condition that you not visit your father’s house for the next thirty days [prior to the divorce]. On condition that you drink no wine for the next thirty days— this is [an effective] separation [since the husband’s condition is fulfilled prior to the divorce].353=T.Git.7:7. One who divorces his wife, saying to her: You are indeed permitted to any man, except for So-and-So!— R. Eliezer permits [the condition, and accepts the divorce]; But sages forbid it [since the stated condition enables the husband to control his ex-wife after the divorce].354=M.Git.9:1; cf. T.Git.9:1. 5. After the death of R. Eliezer, four elders entered to refute his views [on the degree of separation required for divorce]: R. Tarfon, R. Yose the Galilean, R. Elazar b. Azariah, and R. Akiva.
R. Tarfon spoke up and said: If the woman [followed R. Eliezer’s view,] proceeding to marry [So-and-So], her former-husband’s brother, who then died without offspring— how could she contract a levirate marriage [since marriage to the levir is prohibited by the conditional divorce imposed by her former-husband]. Hasn’t [her former-husband] stipulated a condition [contrary] to what is written in the Torah? And whoever stipulates a condition [contrary] to what is written in the Torah— the condition is void?355//M.Ket.9:1;// M.BM.7:11 Thus, you learn that [the original divorce] did not effect a complete separation [and the divorcee remains married to her former-husband].
Then R. Yose the Galilean spoke: Where do we find in the Torah that a woman is permitted to one man but prohibited to another man [like So-and-So]? Rather, a woman permitted to any man is permitted to all men [unless the partners are close relatives or the man is a priest, who may not marry a widow or divorcee]. If she’s prohibited to any man she is prohibited to all men! Thus, you learn that [the original divorce] did not effect a complete separation [and the woman remains married to her first husband].
Said R. Elazar b. Azariah: Separation implies a complete cutting off of his [life] from her [life]. Said R. Yose the Galilean: I prefer the teachings of R. Elazar b. Azariah!
R. Akiva says: Now which woman has the Torah treated with greater stringency— the divorcee [prohibited from marrying So-and-So] or the widow [of So-and-So’s deceased brother]? Clearly, the divorcee’s situation is more stringent than the widow’s [as the following comparison discloses:] Just as the widow, whose case yields a leniency [in that she is truly free of her dead husband], nevertheless is prohibited [from marriage] to a permissible man [until her levir releases her], so, too, the divorcee, whose case yields a stringency, [in that she is still encumbered by the flawed divorce]— isn’t it reasonable that she should be prohibited [from marriage] to a prohibited man [such as So-and-So]? Thus, you learn that [the original divorce] did not effect a complete separation [and the woman who follows R. Eliezer’s view cannot remarry].
Another word: If a woman, [after the death of her first husband,] went and married the fellow [So-and-So, whom her husband warned her against], and he had children with her and then died, and afterward she married another— wouldn’t the offspring of the first marriage carry impaired lineage?356//T.Git.9:1-5. Thus, you learn that [R. Eliezar’s ruling] does not effect a complete separation!
6. “Places it in her hand” (Dt.24:2)— I might assume only that he must place the document in her hand. How do I know to include [places under he domain], such as: her roof, her courtyard, or even the ruins of her house? The Teaching states: “Places it in her hand” (Dt.24:2)— anywhere [her hand can reach]. If so, why does [the verse] specify her hand? Just as her hand is distinctive, in being under her control, so, too, anything under her control [is considered as her hand.]
“Places it in her hand, and sends her from his house” (Dt.24:2)— as soon as he places it in her hand, he must send her from his house. On this basis they taught: One who throws a divorce-document to his wife, while she stands in her house or in her courtyard— she is indeed divorced. {If he threw it to her while she stood in his house or in his courtyard, even if he was with her on her couch— she is not divorced. If [he placed it in] her blouse or in her basket, she is indeed divorced. If he said to her: bring in this bill of debt, or she found it behind him— if she read it, and it was her divorce-document, this is not a valid divorce-document [and the woman remains married.}357=M. Git.8:1-2. The bracketed material is supplied on the basis of the Mishnah. See F:290.ls. 5-6.
וְהָיָה אִם לֹא תִמְצָא חֵן בְּעֵינָיו, מִכָּן הָיוּ בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: לֹא יְגָרֵשׁ אָדָם אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן מָצָא בָּהּ עֶרְוָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: כִּי מָצָא בָהּ עֶרְוַת דָּבָר. וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: אֲפִלּוּ הִקְדִּיחָה תַּבְשִׁילוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: דָּבָר.
Pisqa’ 269345H:263-265;JN2:206-210
1. “In the event that she doesn’t please him” (Dt.24:1).
On this basis:
The circle of Shammai would say:
A man should not divorce his wife
unless he finds her lewd,
as it is stated:
“And he found in her a lewd thing” (`ervat davar; 346For more on this term, cf. Pisqa’ 254.2-3 Dt.24:1).
But the circle of Hillel say: Even if she burned his dinner,
as it is stated:
“And he found in her a lewd thing” (Dt.24:1).347= M. Git. 9:10.
אָמְרוּ בֵּית הִלֵּל לְבֵית שַׁמַּאי: אִם נֶאֱמַר דָּבָר לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר עֶרְוַת, וְאִם נֶאֱמַר עֶרְוַת לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר דָּבָר? שֶׁאִם נֶאֱמַר דָּבָר וְלֹא נֶאֱמַר עֶרְוַת, הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר הַיּוֹצְאָה מִפְּנֵי דָבָר תְּהֵא מֻתֶּרֶת לְהִנָּשֵׂא, וְהַיּוֹצֵאָה מִפְּנֵי עֶרְוָה לֹא תְהֵא מֻתֶּרֶת לְהִנָּשֵׂא, וְאַל תִּתְמַהּ, אִם נֶאֶסְרָה מִן הַמֻּתָּר לָהּ לֹא תְהֵא אֲסוּרָה מִן הָאָסוּר לָהּ, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: עֶרְוַת וְיָצְאָה מִבֵּיתוֹ וְהָלְכָה וְהָיְתָה לְאִישׁ אַחֵר. וְאִם נֶאֱמַר עֶרְוַת וְלֹא נֶאֱמַר דָּבָר, הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר מִפְּנֵי עֶרְוָה תֵּצֵא, מִפְּנֵי דָבָר לֹא תֵּצֵא, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: דָּבָר וְיָצְאָה מִבֵּיתוֹ.
2. Said the circle of Hillel
To the circle of Shammai:
If thing (davar) is said in the verse,
what is the purpose of lewd (`ervat)?
But, if lewd is said,
what is the purpose of thing?
For if thing [alone] had been stated
without the addition of lewd,
I might have thought:
A woman who is expelled over a thing
should be permitted to remarry,
but one expelled because she is lewd,
shouldn’t be permitted to remarry.
So, don’t be surprised!
If she is prohibited [by her lewdness]
from marrying a man who would
normally be permitted to her,
shouldn’t she be prohibited to one
who is normally prohibited to her?
The Teaching states:
“A lewd thing. . . and he shall send her from his house,
so she can go out and be with another man” (Dt.24:1-2)—
[thus, the addition of lewd actually
gives the woman an option to remarry].
And, likewise, if lewd [alone] had been stated
without the addition of thing,
I might have thought:
A woman who is lewd should be expelled,
but one who fails to satisfy in a thing shouldn’t be expelled.
The Teaching states:
“A lewd thing . . . and he shall send her from his house.” (Dt.24:1-2)—
[thus, the addition of thing reinforces
a husband’s option to end the marriage].
רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: אֲפִלּוּ מָצָא אַחֶרֶת נָאָה הֵימֶנָּה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: וְהָיָה אִם לֹא תִמְצָא חֵן בְּעֵינָיו.
R. Akiva says:
Even if he found a prettier one
[a husband may divorce his wife,]
for it is stated:
“In the event that she doesn’t please him” (Dt.24:1). 348=M. Git. 9:10.
וְכָתַב לָהּ, לִשְׁמָהּ. מִכָּן אָמְרוּ: כָּל גֵּט שֶׁנִּכְתַּב שֶׁלֹּא לְשֵׁם אִשָּׁה פָּסוּל. כֵּיצַד? הָיָה עוֹבֵר בַּשּׁוּק כּוּלַּ׳ מַתְנִי׳.
3. “Then he shall have written for her” (Dt.24:1)—
specifically in her name.
On this basis they taught:
Any document of divorce
not written in the name of a specific woman is invalid.
How so?
He was passing in the street
{and heard the voice of scribes reading copy, saying:
The gentleman, So-and-So, divorces
the lady, So-and-So,
from Such-and-Such a place.
And he thought:
This is my name, and that’s my wife’s name!
This is an invalid notice of divorce.}349= M. Git. 3:1. The bracketed text fills in a scribal lacuna on the basis of the mishnaic text and the critical apparatus of F:288, l. 15.
וְכָתַב, אֵין לִי אֶלָּא כָּתַב בִּדְיוֹ, בְּסַם וּבְסִיקְרָא בְּקוֹמוֹס וּבְקַנְקַנְתּוֹם מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: וְכָתַב מִכָּל מָקוֹם.
“Written” (Dt.24:1)—
I might only infer that
it be written in black ink.
How do I know that it can be written
with pigment, with red ink,
with pine-gum ink, or with vitriol?
The Teaching states:
“Written” (Dt.24:1)—
with anything [making a permanent mark]. 350Cf. T.Git.2:3.
סֵפֶר, אֵין לִי אֶלָּא סֵפֶר, מִנַּיִן עֲלֵי קָנִים עֲלֵי אֱגוֹז עֲלֵי זַיִת עֲלֵי חָרוּב? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: וְנָתַן מִכָּל מָקוֹם. אִם כֵּן לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר סֵפֶר? מַה סֵּפֶר מְיֻחָד שֶׁהוּא שֶׁל קַיָּמָא, יָצָא דָבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ שֶׁל קַיָּמָא. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתֵירָה אוֹמֵר: מַה סֵּפֶר מְיֻחָד שֶׁהוּא תָּלוּשׁ מִן הַקַּרְקַע, יָצָא דָבָר שֶׁמְּחֻבָּר לַקַּרְקַע.
“A document”351Heb: sefer. In biblical and rabbinic texts, sefer generally refers to a text of some importance preserved on a scroll and archived in a safe place. (Dt.24:1)—
I might infer only that
it must be written on a parchment-scroll
[like a scriptural text].
How do I know that
it may even be written on leaves
of reeds, nuts, olives, and carob?
The Teaching states:
“He places it in her hand” (Dt.24:1)—
whatever it may be [written on].
Well, if so, why does
[the verse] specify a document [in the form of a scroll]?
Just as a scroll is distinctive for its durability,
any material lacking durability
is excluded [from the rule].
R. Judah b. Betyra says:
Just as a scroll is distinctive
in being detached from the ground,
any writing surface attached to the ground
is excluded [from the rule].352// T. Git.2:3; cf. M.Git.2:4.
כְּרִיתוּת, שֶׁיְּהֵא כְּרִיתוּת. מִכָּן אַתָּה אוֹמֵר: הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשְׁתּוֹ הֲרֵי זֶה גִּטֵּךְ עַל מְנָת שֶׁלֹּא תֵלְכִי לְבֵית אָבִיךְ לְעוֹלָם, עַל מְנָת שֶׁלֹּא תִשְׁתִּי יַיִן לְעוֹלָם, אֵין זֶה כְּרִיתוּת. עַל מְנָת שֶׁלֹּא תֵלְכִי לְבֵית אָבִיךְ מִכָּאן וְעַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם, עַל מְנָת שֶׁלֹּא תִשְׁתִּי יַיִן מִכָּאן וְעַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם, הֲרֵי זֶה כְּרִיתוּת. הַמְגָרֵשׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ וְאָמַר לָהּ הֲרֵי אַתְּ מֻתֶּרֶת לְכָל אָדָם אֶלָּא לִפְלוֹנִי, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מַתִּיר וַחֲכָמִים אוֹסְרִים. לְאַחַר מִיתָתוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר נִכְנְסוּ אַרְבָּעָה זְקֵנִים לְהָשִׁיב עַל דְּבָרָיו: רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא.
4. “Writ of separation” (Dt.24:1)—
it must effect a separation [between the two parties].
On this basis you can teach—
One who says to his wife:
Here is your divorce-document—
on condition that
you never again visit your father’s house;
On condition that
you’ll never again drink wine—
this is not a complete separation
[since the stated condition enables
the husband to control his ex-wife’s
activities after the divorce].
On condition that
you not visit your father’s house
for the next thirty days [prior to the divorce].
On condition that
you drink no wine for the next thirty days—
this is [an effective] separation
[since the husband’s condition
is fulfilled prior to the divorce].353=T.Git.7:7.
One who divorces his wife, saying to her:
You are indeed permitted to any man,
except for So-and-So!—
R. Eliezer permits [the condition, and accepts the divorce];
But sages forbid it
[since the stated condition enables
the husband to control his ex-wife after the divorce].354=M.Git.9:1; cf. T.Git.9:1.
5. After the death of R. Eliezer,
four elders entered to refute his views
[on the degree of separation required for divorce]:
R. Tarfon, R. Yose the Galilean,
R. Elazar b. Azariah, and R. Akiva.
נַעֲנָה רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן וְאָמַר: הָלְכָה וְנִשֵּׂאת לְאָחִיו וּמֵת בְּלֹא וָלָד, הֵיאַךְ מִתְיַבֶּמֶת? לֹא נִמְצָא מַתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה, וְכָל הַמַּתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל. הָא לָמַדְתָּ שֶׁאֵין זֶה כְּרִיתוּת.
R. Tarfon spoke up and said:
If the woman [followed R. Eliezer’s view,]
proceeding to marry [So-and-So],
her former-husband’s brother,
who then died without offspring—
how could she contract a levirate marriage
[since marriage to the levir is prohibited by the conditional divorce
imposed by her former-husband].
Hasn’t [her former-husband]
stipulated a condition [contrary]
to what is written in the Torah?
And whoever stipulates a condition [contrary]
to what is written in the Torah—
the condition is void?355//M.Ket.9:1;// M.BM.7:11
Thus, you learn that
[the original divorce] did not effect a complete separation
[and the divorcee remains married to her former-husband].
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי: הֵיכָן מָצִינוּ בַּתּוֹרָה שֶׁמֻּתֶּרֶת לְאֶחָד וַאֲסוּרָה לְאַחֵר? אֶלָּא מֻתֶּרֶת לְאֶחָד מֻתֶּרֶת לְכָל אָדָם, אֲסוּרָה לְאֶחָד אֲסוּרָה לְכָל אָדָם. הָא לָמַדְתָּ שֶׁאֵין זֶה כְּרִיתוּת.
Then R. Yose the Galilean spoke:
Where do we find in the Torah
that a woman is permitted to one man
but prohibited to another man [like So-and-So]?
Rather, a woman permitted to any man
is permitted to all men
[unless the partners are close relatives
or the man is a priest, who may not marry a widow or divorcee].
If she’s prohibited to any man
she is prohibited to all men!
Thus, you learn that
[the original divorce] did not effect a complete separation
[and the woman remains married to her first husband].
אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה: כְּרִיתוּת – דָּבָר הַכּוֹרֵת בֵּינוֹ לְבֵינָהּ. אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי: רוֹאֶה אֲנִי אֶת דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה.
Said R. Elazar b. Azariah:
Separation implies a complete cutting off
of his [life] from her [life].
Said R. Yose the Galilean:
I prefer the teachings of R. Elazar b. Azariah!
רַבִּי עֲקִיבָה אוֹמֵר: וְכִי בַּמֶּה הֶחְמִירָה תּוֹרָה, בִּגְרוּשָׁה אוֹ בְאַלְמָנָה? חֲמוּרָה גְּרוּשָׁה מֵאַלְמָנָה. מָה אַלְמָנָה קַלָּה נֶאֶסְרָה מִן הַמֻּתָּר לָהּ, גְּרוּשָׁה חֲמוּרָה אֵינוֹ דִין שֶׁתְּהֵא אֲסוּרָה מִן הָאָסוּר לָהּ? הָא לָמַדְתָּ שֶׁאֵין זֶה כְּרִיתוּת.
R. Akiva says:
Now which woman has
the Torah treated with greater stringency—
the divorcee [prohibited from marrying So-and-So]
or the widow [of So-and-So’s deceased brother]?
Clearly, the divorcee’s situation
is more stringent than the widow’s
[as the following comparison discloses:]
Just as the widow,
whose case yields a leniency
[in that she is truly free of her dead husband],
nevertheless is prohibited [from marriage]
to a permissible man [until her levir releases her],
so, too, the divorcee, whose case yields a stringency,
[in that she is still encumbered by the flawed divorce]—
isn’t it reasonable that she should be prohibited [from marriage]
to a prohibited man [such as So-and-So]?
Thus, you learn that
[the original divorce] did not effect a complete separation
[and the woman who follows R. Eliezer’s view cannot remarry].
דָּבָר אַחֵר: הָלְכָה וְנִשֵּׂאת לְאֶחָד וְהָיוּ לוֹ בָנִים מִמֶּנָּה וָמֵת, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִשֵּׂאת לָזֶה, לֹא נִמְצְאוּ בָנָיו שֶׁל רִאשׁוֹן מַמְזֵרִים? הָא לָמַדְתָּ שֶׁאֵין זֶה כְּרִיתוּת.
Another word:
If a woman,
[after the death of her first husband,]
went and married the fellow
[So-and-So, whom her husband warned her against],
and he had children with her and then died,
and afterward she married another—
wouldn’t the offspring of the first marriage
carry impaired lineage?356//T.Git.9:1-5.
Thus, you learn that [R. Eliezar’s ruling]
does not effect a complete separation!
בְּיָדָהּ, אֵין לִי אֶלָּא בְּיָדָהּ, מִנַּיִן לְרַבּוֹת גַּגָּהּ חֲצֵרָהּ וְחֻרְבָתָהּ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: וְנָתַן מִכָּל מָקוֹם. אִם כֵּן לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר בְּיָדָהּ? מַה יָּדָהּ מְיֻחֶדֶת שֶׁהִיא רְשׁוּתָהּ, כָּךְ כָּל דָּבָר שֶׁהוּא רְשׁוּתָהּ.
6. “Places it in her hand” (Dt.24:2)—
I might assume only that
he must place the document in her hand.
How do I know to include
[places under he domain], such as:
her roof, her courtyard, or even
the ruins of her house?
The Teaching states:
“Places it in her hand” (Dt.24:2)—
anywhere [her hand can reach].
If so, why does [the verse] specify her hand?
Just as her hand is distinctive,
in being under her control,
so, too, anything under her control
[is considered as her hand.]
וְנָתַן בְּיָדָהּ וְשִׁלְּחָהּ מִבֵּיתוֹ, כֵּיוָן שֶׁנּוֹתְנוֹ בְּיָדָהּ מְשַׁלְּחָהּ מִבֵּיתוֹ. מִכָּן אָמְרוּ: הַזּוֹרֵק גֵּט לְאִשְׁתּוֹ וְהִיא בְּתוֹךְ בֵּיתָהּ אוֹ בְּתוֹךְ חֲצֵרָהּ הֲרֵי זוֹ מְגֹרֶשֶׁת וְכוּ׳ מַתְנִי׳, אָמַר לָהּ: כִּנְסִי שְׁטַר חוֹב זֶה, אוֹ שֶׁמְּצָאַתּוֹ מֵאַחֲרָיו וְכוּ׳ מַתְנִי׳.
“Places it in her hand, and sends her from his house” (Dt.24:2)—
as soon as he places it in her hand,
he must send her from his house.
On this basis they taught:
One who throws a divorce-document
to his wife, while she stands
in her house or in her courtyard—
she is indeed divorced.
{If he threw it to her while she stood
in his house or in his courtyard,
even if he was with her on her couch—
she is not divorced.
If [he placed it in] her blouse or in her basket,
she is indeed divorced.
If he said to her: bring in this bill of debt,
or she found it behind him—
if she read it, and it was her divorce-document,
this is not a valid divorce-document
[and the woman remains married.}357=M. Git.8:1-2. The bracketed material is supplied on the basis of the Mishnah. See F:290.ls. 5-6.