And know further that one who desires to merit the quality of peace must guard himself also against the accepting of lashon hara and rechiluth. For aside from the punishment itself (Chazal having said (Pesachim 118a): "If one accepts lashon hara, he is fit to be thrown to the dogs, it being written (Shemoth 23:1): 'Do not bear a false report,' preceded by (Ibid. 22:30): 'To the dog shall you throw it'"), one further comes through it to vain hatred, quarrels, and contention. For since he accepts the thing at the outset as true, that Ploni spoke against him or did this and this to him, it is almost impossible for him afterwards not to cause his friend suffering or to quarrel with him because of this. And in the end, this results in their becoming great foes, each one wanting to "swallow the other's blood," and rejoicing in his misfortune. And all of this resulted from acceptance, his acceptance of the speaker's words at the outset as absolute truth. If he had followed the way of the Torah, he would not have come to this. For when someone comes to him and tells him what Ploni did or said to him, he should have thought: Perhaps the thing is an outright lie, or perhaps he added something that changed the complexion of the thing entirely. Or even if he added nothing, perhaps he did not relate the entire thing as it was, but left out several words. Or perhaps he varied his intonation, and thereby entirely changed things. Or perhaps he should have thought of something in defense of the one spoken of, that he did what he did unwittingly, or the like. And [if he had proceeded thus], as a matter of course, things would not have come to quarreling and contention and vain hatred.
But, in such matters, the yetzer hara, who desires a man to accept lashan hara, comes to him and entices him, making him think: How can I suspect him of relating something that never happened, an outright lie? Or, how can I suspect him of adding some falsehood and transgressing "From a thing of falsehood shall you distance yourself?" You, likewise, answer him: It is better that I suspect this speaker of having told me a falsehood than to believe what he told me. For if you saw a man wearing sha'atnez or shaving the edges of his head or his beard and then coming to you and telling you about one of your friends that he spoke lashon hara about you, you certainly would not accept it as the truth, but you would say to him: Get away from me! I shall not believe you about my friend! If the other negative commandments of the Torah mean nothing to you, then certainly the issur of lying is permissible to you! And is it not exactly the same in our case? For even if his words are the truth, has he not transgressed a negative commandment of the Torah — (Vayikra 19:16): "You shall not go talebearing!" For this is an extremely great issur and applies even if what is said is true, as explained in all of the poskim. If so, he is also to be suspected of inventing an outright lie, or, in any event, of mixing what he is saying with an element of falsehood and thereby changing the entire complexion of the matter.
And great is the merit of the man who does not accept lashon hara even against a plain Jew. How much more so must he take care not to accept it if spoken against a man of eminence, in which instance his merit is even greater. As we find in Tanna d'bei Eliyahu 7: "And so, in an instance of good. If one does a mitzvah, good is decreed upon him until four generations…. It was said about Yeravam ben Yoash that he was a man who deferred to the prophets. For this reason those peoples that the Holy One Blessed be He did not deliver into the hand of Yehoshua bin Nun nor into the hand of David, king of Israel, He delivered into the hand of Yeravam ben Yoash, as it is written (II Kings 14:25): 'He [Yeravam] restored the boundary of Israel from Levo Chamath until the sea of the plain, etc.' Now what was so special about Yeravam ben Yoash that he restored the boundary of Israel? Was he not an idolator? But because he did not accept lashon hara against Amos [the prophet …], it is, therefore, written, 'He restored the boundary of Israel, etc.' From here it is deduced that 'merit' devolves from the meritorious and liability from the culpable. And by this measure He conducts Himself with all of Israel wherever they find themselves and with all of the idolators and with all the families of the earth."
And know, my brother, that if one guards himself from the acceptance of lashon hara and rechiluth, his Torah and his mitzvoth will remain intact. But if he does not do so, he is very liable to have deducted from him many hundreds and thousands of mitzvoth, such as answering "Amen," "Amen, Yeheh Shmeih Rabbah" and learning Torah. For it is known that it is the nature of the scoffers and the speakers of lashon hara to tell their tales to whoever want to hear them, even in the synagogue or in the house of study at the time of Torah learning and in the midst of Kaddish and the repetition of the Amidah and the reading of the Torah. But if one is known in the city as not giving ear to lashon hara and rechiluth, they [the scoffers, etc.] will prevent themselves from speaking it, even to others, if they see him standing in their midst, lest he brand them as speakers of lashon hara in their presence. How much more so, will they not speak it to him himself.
And know further that he who wishes to be perfectly free of the sin of accepting lashon hara and rechiluth, should constantly reprove the members of his household [in this regard] and apprise them of the greatness of the reward for one who is careful of his speech, and, the opposite, the greatness of the punishment, for one who is not, so that they not fall through their speaking into the snare of lashon hara. (See Chafetz Chaim, Part One, Principle VIII:4 and Part Two, Principle VI:5)
יְבֹאַר בּוֹ עֵנְיַן הַזְּהִירוּת מֵעֲוֹן לָשׁוֹן הָרָע וּרְכִילוּת.
In this chapter there will be explained the guarding of oneself against accepting lashon hara and rechiluth.
וְדַע עוֹד, דְּמִי שֶׁרוֹצֶה לִזְכּוֹת בְְּמִדַּת הַשָּׁלוֹם, צָרִיךְ לִשְׁמֹר אֶת עַצְמוֹ גַּם כֵּן מֵעִנְיַן קַבָּלַת לָשׁוֹן הָרָע וּרְכִילוּת, דְּמִלְּבַד עֶצֶם הָעֹנֶשׁ שֶׁיֵּשׁ עַל זֶה כְּמוֹ שֶׁאָמְרוּ חֲזַ"ל (פסחים קי"ח.): כָּל הַמְקַבֵּל לָשׁוֹן הָרָע - רָאוּי לְהַשְׁלִיכוֹ לַכְּלָבִים, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמות כ"ג א'): "לֹא תִשָּׂא שֵׁמַע שָׁוְא" וְסָמִיךְ לֵהּ (שמות כ"ב ל'): "לַכֶּלֶב תַּשְׁלִיכוּן אוֹתוֹ", עוֹד בָּא הָאָדָם עַל יְדֵי זֶה לִידֵי שִׂנְאַת חִנָּם וּקְטָטוֹת וּמְרִיבוֹת לְבַסּוֹף. כִּי מִכֵּיוָן שֶׁמְּקַבֵּל אֶת הַדָּבָר תְּחִלָּה לֶאֱמֶת, שֶׁפְּלוֹנִי דִּבֵּר עָלָיו אוֹ עָשָׂה לוֹ עִנְיַן פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי, כִּמְעַט אִי אֶפְשָׁר לָאָדָם, שֶׁיִּמְנַע עַצְמוֹ מִלְּצַעֵר אַחַר כָּךְ אֶת חֲבֵרוֹ וּלְהִתְקוֹטֵט עִמּוֹ עֲבוּר זֶה, וּלְבַסּוֹף נִסְבַּב הַדָּבָר, שֶׁעַל יְדֵי זֶה נַעֲשִׂים שׂוֹנְאִים גְּדוֹלִים, שֶׁכָּל אֶחָד רוֹצֶה לִבְלֹעַ דָּמוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵרוֹ וְשָׂמֵחַ לְאֵידוֹ. וְכָל זֶה נַעֲשָׂה עַל יְדֵי הַקַּבָּלָה, שֶׁקִּבֵּל אֶת הַדָּבָר מִתְּחִלָּה לֶאֱמֶת גָּמוּר. וְאִלּוּ הָיָה הוֹלֵךְ בְּדֶרֶךְ הַתּוֹרָה, לֹא הָיָה בָּא לָזֶה, כִּי כְּשֶׁבָּא אֶחָד אֶצְלוֹ וְסִפֵּר לוֹ אֵיךְ שֶׁפְּלוֹנִי עָשָׂה לוֹ וְסִפֵּר עָלָיו כָּךְ וְכָךְ, יֵשׁ לוֹ לַחֲשֹׁב בְּדַעְתּוֹ: אוּלַי הַדָּבָר שֶׁקֶר מֵעִקָּרוֹ אוֹ הוֹסִיף בּוֹ מְעַט שֶׁקֶר, וְעַל יְדֵי זֶה נִשְׁתַּנָּה הַדָּבָר בְּכֻלּוֹ, אוֹ אֲפִלּוּ אִם הַמְסַפֵּר לֹא הוֹסִיף בְּזֶה הָעִנְיָן כְּלָל, אוּלַי לֹא סִפֵּר כָּל הָעִנְיָן כְּמוֹת שֶׁהוּא וְגָרַע בּוֹ אֵיזֶה תֵּבוֹת, אוֹ אָמַר בְּנִגּוּן אַחֵר, וְעַל יְדֵי זֶה נִשְׁתַּנֶּה הַדָּבָר לְגַמְרֵי אוֹ לַחֲשֹׁב אֵיזֶה צַד זְכוּת אַחֵר עַל הָאִישׁ, שֶׁבִּשְׁגָגָה הָיָה הָעִנְיָן וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה, וּמִמֵּילָא לֹא הָיָה בָּא הַדָּבָר לִידֵי קטָטָה וּמְרִיבָה וְלִידֵי שִׂנְאַת חִנָּם.
And know further that one who desires to merit the quality of peace must guard himself also against the accepting of lashon hara and rechiluth. For aside from the punishment itself (Chazal having said (Pesachim 118a): "If one accepts lashon hara, he is fit to be thrown to the dogs, it being written (Shemoth 23:1): 'Do not bear a false report,' preceded by (Ibid. 22:30): 'To the dog shall you throw it'"), one further comes through it to vain hatred, quarrels, and contention. For since he accepts the thing at the outset as true, that Ploni spoke against him or did this and this to him, it is almost impossible for him afterwards not to cause his friend suffering or to quarrel with him because of this. And in the end, this results in their becoming great foes, each one wanting to "swallow the other's blood," and rejoicing in his misfortune. And all of this resulted from acceptance, his acceptance of the speaker's words at the outset as absolute truth. If he had followed the way of the Torah, he would not have come to this. For when someone comes to him and tells him what Ploni did or said to him, he should have thought: Perhaps the thing is an outright lie, or perhaps he added something that changed the complexion of the thing entirely. Or even if he added nothing, perhaps he did not relate the entire thing as it was, but left out several words. Or perhaps he varied his intonation, and thereby entirely changed things. Or perhaps he should have thought of something in defense of the one spoken of, that he did what he did unwittingly, or the like. And [if he had proceeded thus], as a matter of course, things would not have come to quarreling and contention and vain hatred.
הג"ה. [אַךְ בְּעִנְיָן כָּזֶה הַיֵּצֶר הָרָע, שֶׁרוֹצֶה שֶׁיְּקַבֵּל הָאָדָם לָשׁוֹן הָרָע, בָּא אֶל הָאָדָם וּמְסִיתוֹ לֵאמֹר: אֵיךְ אֶחְשֹׁד אֶת הַמְסַפֵּר שֶׁיֹּאמַר דָּבָר אֲשֶׁר לֹא הָיָה וְשִׁקֵּר מֵעִקָּרוֹ, אוֹ יוֹסִיף בָּהּ מְעַט מִן הַשֶּׁקֶר וְיַעֲבֹר עַל "מִדְּבַר שֶׁקֶר תִּרְחָק"? אַף אַתָּה הָשֵׁב לוֹ: טוֹב לִי לַחְשֹׁד אֶת הַמְסַפֵּר הַזֶּה, שֶׁאָמַר דְּבַר שֶׁקֶר עַל חֲבֵרוֹ, מִשֶּׁאַאֲמִין מַה שֶּׁסִּפֵּר לִי. כִּי הֲלֹא אִם הָיִיתָ רוֹאֶה אָדָם שֶׁהוּא לוֹבֵשׁ שַׁעַטְנֵז וּמַקִּיף פְּאַת רֹאשׁוֹ וּזְקָנוֹ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ הָיָה בָּא אֵלֶיךָ וּמְסַפֵּר עַל אֶחָד מֵחֲבֵרְךָ, שֶׁדִּבֵּר עָלֶיךָ אֵיזֶה רָעָה, בְּוַדַּאי לֹא הָיִיתָ מְקַבֵּל אֶת הַדָּבָר לֶאֱמֶת, וְהָיִיתָ מֵשִׁיב לוֹ: לֵךְ מִמֶּנִּי, לֹא אַאֲמִינְךָ עַל חֲבֵרִי. אַחֲרֵי שֶׁהֻפְקַר אֶצְלְךָ שְׁאָר לָאוִין דְּאוֹרַיְתָא, בְּוַדַּאי הֻתַּר לְךָ גַּם אִסּוּר שֶׁקֶר. וַהֲלֹא אַף בְּעִנְיָנֵנוּ כֵּן הַדָּבָר, שֶׁזֶּה הַמְסַפֵּר, אֲפִלּוּ אִם כִּדְבָרָיו כֵּן הוּא, עָבַר עַל לָאו דְּאוֹרַיְתָא (ויקרא י"ט ט"ז) "לֹא תֵלֵךְ רָכִיל", שֶׁהוּא אִסּוּר גָּדוֹל עַד מְאֹד, וְהוּא אֲפִלּוּ עַל אֱמֶת כַּמְבֹאָר בְּכָל הַפּוֹסְקִים, אִם כֵּן חָשׁוּד הוּא גַּם כֵּן לִבְדוֹת שֶׁקֶר מֵעִקָּרוֹ מִלִּבּוֹ, אוֹ עַל כָּל פָּנִים לְעָרֵב בְּתוֹךְ הָעִנְיָן מְעַט מִן הַשֶּׁקֶר וְעַל יְדֵי זֶה נִשְׁתַּנֶּה הַדָּבָר מֵרֹאשׁוֹ לְסוֹפוֹ].
But, in such matters, the yetzer hara, who desires a man to accept lashan hara, comes to him and entices him, making him think: How can I suspect him of relating something that never happened, an outright lie? Or, how can I suspect him of adding some falsehood and transgressing "From a thing of falsehood shall you distance yourself?" You, likewise, answer him: It is better that I suspect this speaker of having told me a falsehood than to believe what he told me. For if you saw a man wearing sha'atnez or shaving the edges of his head or his beard and then coming to you and telling you about one of your friends that he spoke lashon hara about you, you certainly would not accept it as the truth, but you would say to him: Get away from me! I shall not believe you about my friend! If the other negative commandments of the Torah mean nothing to you, then certainly the issur of lying is permissible to you! And is it not exactly the same in our case? For even if his words are the truth, has he not transgressed a negative commandment of the Torah — (Vayikra 19:16): "You shall not go talebearing!" For this is an extremely great issur and applies even if what is said is true, as explained in all of the poskim. If so, he is also to be suspected of inventing an outright lie, or, in any event, of mixing what he is saying with an element of falsehood and thereby changing the entire complexion of the matter.
וּגְדוֹלָה הַזְּכוּת שֶׁל הָאָדָם, שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְקַבֵּל לָשׁוֹן הָרָע אֲפִלּוּ עַל סְתַם אָדָם מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל, וְכָל שֶׁכֵּן אִם סִפְּרוּ לוֹ עַל אָדָם חָשׁוּב, שֶׁיִּזָּהֵר מִלְּקַבֵּל עָלָיו, וּזְכוּתוֹ יוֹתֵר גְּדוֹלָה עֲבוּר זֶה, וְכִדְאִיתָא בְּתָנָא דְּבֵי אֵלִיָּהוּ חֵלֶק ב' פֶּרֶק ז' וְזֶה לְשׁוֹנוֹ: וְכֵן בְּמִדַּת הַטּוֹב, כְּשֶׁאָדָם עוֹשֶׂה קוֹנְסִין עָלָיו טוֹבָה עַד ד' דוֹרוֹת, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר וְגוֹ' אָמְרוּ עָלָיו עַל יָרָבְעָם בֶּן יוֹאָשׁ, שֶׁהוּא הָיָה בֶּן אָדָם שֶׁהָיָה נוֹהֵג כָּבוֹד בַּנְּבִיאִים, לָכֵן אוֹתָן הָעַמִּים, מַה שֶּׁלֹּא מָסַר הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא בְּיַד יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן נוּן וְלֹא בְּיַד דָּוִד מֶלֶךְ יִשְׂרָאֵל, מָסַר הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא בְּיַד יָרָבְעָם בֶּן יוֹאָשׁ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (מלכים ב' י"ד כ"ה): "הוּא הֵשִׁיב אֶת גְּבוּל יִשְׂרָאֵל מִלְּבֹא חֲמָת עַד יָם הָעֲרָבָה" וְגוֹ', וְכִי מַה טִּיבוֹ שֶׁל יָרָבְעָם בֶּן יוֹאָשׁ שֶׁהוּא הֵשִּׁיב אֶת גְּבוּל יִשְׂרָאֵל וַהֲלֹא הָיָה עוֹבֵד עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה? אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם שֶׁלֹּא קִבֵּל לָשׁוֹן הָרָע עַל עָמוֹס, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר וְגוֹ' לְכָךְ נֶאֱמַר: "הוּא הֵשִׁיב אֶת גְּבוּל יִשְׂרָאֵל" וְגוֹ', מִכָּאן אָמְרוּ: מְגַלְגְּלִין זְכוּת עַל יְדֵי זַכַּאי וְחוֹבָה עַל יְדֵי חַיָּב. וְכֵן בַּמִּדָּה הַזֹּאת הוּא נוֹהֵג בְּכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּכָל מְקוֹמוֹת מוֹשְׁבוֹתָם וּבְכָל הָעוֹבְדֵי כּוֹכָבִים וּמַזָּלוֹת וּבְכָל מִשְׁפְּחוֹת הָאֲדָמָה, עַד כָּאן לְשׁוֹנוֹ.
And great is the merit of the man who does not accept lashon hara even against a plain Jew. How much more so must he take care not to accept it if spoken against a man of eminence, in which instance his merit is even greater. As we find in Tanna d'bei Eliyahu 7: "And so, in an instance of good. If one does a mitzvah, good is decreed upon him until four generations…. It was said about Yeravam ben Yoash that he was a man who deferred to the prophets. For this reason those peoples that the Holy One Blessed be He did not deliver into the hand of Yehoshua bin Nun nor into the hand of David, king of Israel, He delivered into the hand of Yeravam ben Yoash, as it is written (II Kings 14:25): 'He [Yeravam] restored the boundary of Israel from Levo Chamath until the sea of the plain, etc.' Now what was so special about Yeravam ben Yoash that he restored the boundary of Israel? Was he not an idolator? But because he did not accept lashon hara against Amos [the prophet …], it is, therefore, written, 'He restored the boundary of Israel, etc.' From here it is deduced that 'merit' devolves from the meritorious and liability from the culpable. And by this measure He conducts Himself with all of Israel wherever they find themselves and with all of the idolators and with all the families of the earth."
וְדַע אָחִי, דְּמִי שֶׁשׁוֹמֵר אֶת עַצְמוֹ מֵעִנְיַן קַבָּלַת לָשׁוֹן הָרָע וּרְכִילוּת, יִשָּׁאֲרוּ לוֹ תּוֹרָתוֹ וּמִצְוֹתָיו בִּשְׁלֵמוּתָם, דְּאִי לָאו הָכִי עָלוּל מְאֹד שֶׁיִּגָּרַע מִמֶּנוּ כַּמָּה מֵאוֹת וַאֲלָפִים מִצְוֹת, וְהֵם שֶׁל עֲנִיַּת אָמֵן וְאָמֵן יְהֵא שְׁמֵהּ רַבָּה וְלִמּוּד הַתּוֹרָה, כַּיָּדוּעַ הוּא שֶׁמִּטֶּבַע הַלֵּצִים וּבַעֲלֵי לָשׁוֹן הָרָע לְסַפֵּר עִנְיְנֵיהֶם וְסִפּוּרֵיהֶם, לְמִי שֶׁיִּרְצֶה לִשְׁמֹעַ לָהֶם, אֲפִלּוּ בְּבֵית הַכְּנֶסֶת וּבְבֵית הַמִּדְרָשׁ. בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁעוֹסְקִים בַּתּוֹרָה * וּבָזֶה פֵּרַשְׁתִּי בְּדֶרֶךְ רֶמֶז מַה שֶּׁאָמְרוּ חֲזַ"ל בִּבְרָכוֹת דַּף ו'.: הַנֵּי מָאנֵי דְּרַבָּנָן דְּבָלוּ מֵחוּפְיָא דִּידְהוּ, (בגדי התלמידים, שמתבלים מהר מפני שבאים המזיקים ומתחככים בהם), כִּי מָאנֵי הוּא רֶמֶז לְמַעֲשֵׂה הַמִּצְוֹת, שֶׁהֵם מְכֻנִּים בְּשֵׁם בְּגָדִים לַנֶּפֶשׁ, כְּמוֹ שֶׁכָּתַב הַגְּרָ"א בְּמִשְׁלֵי, וּבַעֲלֵי לָשׁוֹן הָרָע מַזִּיקִין מַמָּשׁ לַגּוּף וְלַנֶּפֶשׁ, כַּמּוּבָא בְּכַמָּה מְקוֹמוֹת: וּבְתוֹךְ אֲמִירַת קַדִּישׁ וַחֲזָרַת הַשַׁ"ץ וּבִשְׁעַת קְרִיאַת הַתּוֹרָה, אֲבָל מִי שֶׁנִּתְפַּרְסֵם עִנְיָנוֹ בְּתוֹךְ הָעִיר, שֶׁלֹּא יֹאבֶה לִשְׁמֹעַ לָשׁוֹן הָרָע וּרְכִילוּת, יִמְנְעוּ אֶת עַצְמָם מִלְּסַפֵּר, אֲפִלּוּ לַאֲנָשִׁים אֲחֵרִים, אִם יִרְאוּהוּ עוֹמֵד בְּתוֹכָם, פֶּן יַעֲשֶׂה אוֹתָם לִמְסַפְּרֵי לָשׁוֹן הָרָע לִפְנֵי הַשׁוֹמְעִים, וְכָל שֶׁכֵּן שֶׁלֹּא יְסַפְּרוּ לוֹ בְּעַצְמוֹ.
And know, my brother, that if one guards himself from the acceptance of lashon hara and rechiluth, his Torah and his mitzvoth will remain intact. But if he does not do so, he is very liable to have deducted from him many hundreds and thousands of mitzvoth, such as answering "Amen," "Amen, Yeheh Shmeih Rabbah" and learning Torah. For it is known that it is the nature of the scoffers and the speakers of lashon hara to tell their tales to whoever want to hear them, even in the synagogue or in the house of study at the time of Torah learning and in the midst of Kaddish and the repetition of the Amidah and the reading of the Torah. But if one is known in the city as not giving ear to lashon hara and rechiluth, they [the scoffers, etc.] will prevent themselves from speaking it, even to others, if they see him standing in their midst, lest he brand them as speakers of lashon hara in their presence. How much more so, will they not speak it to him himself.
וְדַע עוֹד, דְּמִי שֶׁרוֹצֶה לִהְיוֹת זָהִיר בִּשְׁלֵמוּת מֵעֲוֹן קַבָּלַת לָשׁוֹן הָרָע וּרְכִילוּת, יִהְיֶה רָגִיל תָּמִיד לְהוֹכִיחַ לְאַנְשֵׁי בֵּיתוֹ וּלְהַצִּיעַ לִפְנֵיהֶם גֹּדֶל הַשָּׂכָר לְמִי שֶׁזָּהִיר בְּדִבּוּר, וּלְהֶפֶךְ גֹּדֶל הָעֹנֶשׁ, רַחֲמָנָא לִיצְלָן, כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִפֹּל עַל יְדֵי סִפּוּרֵיהֶם בְּרֶשֶׁת קַבָּלַת לָשׁוֹן הָרָע וּרְכִילוּת. וְעַיֵּן בֶּחָפֵץ חַיִּים חֵלֶק א' כְּלָל ח' סָעִיף ד' וּבְחֵלֶקּ ב' בִּכְלָל ו' סָעִיף ה;
And know further that he who wishes to be perfectly free of the sin of accepting lashon hara and rechiluth, should constantly reprove the members of his household [in this regard] and apprise them of the greatness of the reward for one who is careful of his speech, and, the opposite, the greatness of the punishment, for one who is not, so that they not fall through their speaking into the snare of lashon hara. (See Chafetz Chaim, Part One, Principle VIII:4 and Part Two, Principle VI:5)