This mishna, which also appears in tractate Temura, deals with the five sin offerings left to die. It is cited here because of its relevance to the halakhot of misuse. The mishna first mentions three of those offerings: The offspring of a sin offering, and an animal that is the substitute for a sin offering, whether or not the owners achieved atonement by means of another offering, and a sin offering whose owners have died before the offering was sacrificed, shall die.And the other two sin offerings left to die are the sin offering whose year since birth passed and is therefore unfit for sacrifice, and a sin offering that was lost and when it was found it was blemished, with regard to which the halakhot are as follows: If the sin offering was found after the owner achieved atonement through the sacrifice of another animal as a sin offering, then the blemished animal shall die, and it does not render a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute, as it is has neither inherent sanctity, which would make it fit for sacrifice on the altar, nor sanctity that inheres in its value. And one may not derive benefit from the found animal ab initio, but if he derived benefit from the animal he is not liable for its misuse.And if the animal whose year passed was found before the owner achieved atonement, the found animal shall graze until it becomes blemished [shetista’ev], at which point it may not be sacrificed; and it shall be sold and the owner shall purchase another animal with the money received from its sale. The animal that was found blemished may be sold immediately, and the owner shall purchase another animal with the money received from its sale. In both cases, the animal renders a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute, and one who derives benefit from it is liable for misusing it.
In the case of a nazirite who designated money for the three offerings he is obligated to bring upon completion of his naziriteship, a sin offering, a burnt offering, and a peace offering, but he did not specify which money was designated for which offering, since it is not clear what the money is intended for, one may not derive benefit from the money ab initio, but if he derived benefit from the money he is not liable for its misuse. This is due to the fact that all the money is fit for purchase of the peace offering, for which one is liable for misuse only after its blood is sprinkled, and therefore there is no liability for its misuse. If the nazirite died and he had undesignated funds, meaning he did not specify which money was for each of the three offerings, all the money will be allocated for purchase of communal gift offerings. If the nazirite died and he had specified money, the money specified for purchase of the sin offering shall go to the Dead Sea for disposal, because one may not derive benefitab initio from the money of a sin offering whose owner has died. But if it was not disposed of, and one derived benefit from the money, he is not liable for its misuse. With the money specified for purchase of the burnt offering, one shall bring a gift burnt offering, and one is liable for misusing the funds. With the money specified for purchase of the peace offering, one shall bring a gift peace offering. Although it is a gift offering, the restrictions of the peace offering of the naziriteship apply, and therefore it is eaten for one day and that same night, not the standard two days and one night of a regular peace offering. And nevertheless the peace offering does not require the bringing of the loaves that accompany the peace offering of naziriteship, as it is written with regard to the loaves: “And shall place them on the hands of the nazirite” (Numbers 6:19), and in this case the nazirite is dead.
Rabbi Shimon says: With regard to misuse of the blood of offerings that is to be sprinkled on the altar, the halakha is lenient with regard to the status of the blood at the outset and stringent at its conclusion. With regard to misuse of the wine of the libations that accompany the offerings, the halakha is stringent with regard to the status of the wine at their outset and lenient at their conclusion. The mishna explains: With regard to blood, at its outset, before it is sprinkled on the altar, one is not liable for misusing it; but once its remainder has been poured on the base of the altar and it emerges via the canal that runs through the Temple to the Kidron Valley at the foot of the Temple Mount, one is liable for misusing it. With regard to libations, at their outset, from the moment they were consecrated, one is liable for misusing them, but once they have descended to the drainpipes built into the altar and which extend beneath it, through which the libations flowed out of the Temple, one is no longer liable for misusing them, as their mitzva was fulfilled and therefore their sanctity has ceased.
With regard to the removal of ash from the inner altar to the place where the ashes lifted from the outer altar are deposited, and similarly with regard to the wicks of the Candelabrum, one may not derive benefit from them ab initio; but if one derived benefit from them he is not liable for their misuse. In the case of one who consecrates anew the ash that has been removed, he is liable for misusing it. With regard to doves whose time of fitness for sacrifice has not arrived, as they are too young, and pigeons whose time of fitness for sacrifice has passed, as they are too old, one may not derive benefit from them ab initio; but if one derived benefit from them he is not liable for their misuse. The previous [mishna] teaches that one may not derive benefit from doves whose time of fitness for sacrifice has not arrived and from pigeons whose time of fitness for sacrifice has passed, but one who derived benefit from them is not liable for their misuse. Rabbi Shimon disagrees with this ruling and says: With regard to doves whose time of fitness for sacrifice has not arrived, one is liable for misusing them. With regard to pigeons whose time of fitness for sacrifice has passed, one may not derive benefitab initio, but if one derived benefit from them he is not liable for their misuse.
With regard to the milk of sacrificial animals and the eggs of sacrificial doves, one may not derive benefit from them ab initio, but if one derived benefit from them after the fact he is not liable for their misuse.In what case is this statement, that if one derived benefit from the eggs or milk of sacrificial animals, he is not liable for their misuse, said? It is stated in the case of sacrificial animals offered on the altar, as their eggs and milk are not brought to the altar and therefore they are considered distinct from the offerings themselves. But this is not the halakhain the case of animals that are not sacrificed and are consecrated only for Temple maintenance. For example, if one consecrated a hen he is liable for misusing it and for misusing its egg; if one consecrated a donkey he is liable for misusing it and for misusing its milk, as the animal and its milk, and likewise the hen and its eggs, are both consecrated for Temple maintenance and are deemed a single unit.
With regard to any consecrated item that is fit for sacrifice on the altarbut is not fit for Temple maintenance, or if it is fit for Temple maintenance but not for sacrifice on the altar, or fit neither for the altar nor for Temple maintenance, nevertheless one is liable for misusing it. The mishna clarifies each of these categories: Fit for Temple maintenance but not for sacrifice on the altar, how so? In a case where one consecrated a cistern full of water, the water is not fit for sacrifice on the altar, as only water from the Siloam pool is used for the altar. Nevertheless, it is fit for Temple maintenance, e.g., to knead clay with it for use in reinforcing the walls of the Temple. What is the case of an item fit neither for the altar nor for Temple maintenance? If one consecrated garbage dumps full of manure, the place and its contents are fit neither for the altar nor for Temple maintenance. Rather, they are sold and the money received from the sale is donated to the Temple. What is the case of an item fit for sacrifice on the altar but not fit for Temple maintenance? If one consecrated a dovecote full of pigeons, the pigeons are fit for the altar while the dovecote is not fit even for Temple maintenance. Or if one consecrated a tree full of fruit, as the fruit is fit for the altar whereas the tree is not fit even for Temple maintenance. For example, grapes are fit for the altar as wine, but the vines are not fit for Temple maintenance, as they are too flimsy for construction. Another case where the consecrated item is fit for neither the altar nor Temple maintenance is a field full of grass. In all those cases, one is liable for misusing both them and that which is within them, as those that are unfit for use in the Temple will be sold and their money will be used for the altar or for Temple maintenance. But if one consecrated an empty cistern and it was subsequently filled with water, or if one consecrated an empty garbage dump and it was subsequently filled with manure, or an empty dovecote and it was subsequently filled with pigeons, or a tree without fruit and it was subsequently filled with fruit, or an empty field and it was subsequently filled with grass; in all these cases one is liable for misusing them but one is not liable for misusing that which is within them. There is no misuse with regard to enhancements that developed in consecrated property. Rabbi Yosei disagrees in two of the above cases and says: In the case of one who consecrates the empty field in which grass grew or the empty tree on which fruit grew, he is liable for misusing both them and their growth, because these are growths of consecrated property, despite the fact that they grew there only after the property was consecrated. Apropos the growths of consecrated property, the mishna states that an offspring born to a tithed animal before it was tithed may not be given to suckle from the tithed mother, as it is a non-sacred animal that may not be allowed to derive benefit from consecrated property. And there are others who stipulate in this manner, i.e., that the consecration does not apply to the milk. The same is true of the offspring of sacrificial animals born to them before their consecration; they may not suckle from the sacrificial animal. And in this case as well, there are others who stipulate in this manner, i.e., to enable the offspring to suckle. The laborers, who are generally permitted to eat the food of their employer, may not eat from consecrated dried figs, if they work with Temple produce. Rather, they can buy food with the money they are paid. And likewise, a cow working with consecrated property, e.g., threshing Temple produce, may not eat from consecrated vetch [mikarshinei].
With regard to the roots of the non-sacred tree of an ordinary person that enter into consecrated land, and the roots of a consecrated tree that enter into the non-sacred land of an ordinary person, one may not derive benefit from them ab initio, but if he derived benefit from them he is not liable for their misuse. With regard to water of a spring that flows in a non-sacred field but which emerges from that field and flows into a consecrated field, when it is in the consecrated field one may not derive benefit from it ab initio, but if one derived benefit from it he is not liable for its misuse. Once the spring emerges outside the consecrated field one may derive benefit from the water. With regard to the water that was drawn from the Siloam pool into the golden jug, which was not consecrated as a service vessel, to bring it to the altar for libation on the festival of Sukkot, one may not derive benefit from the water ab initio, as it was drawn for use in the Temple service. But if one derived benefit from it he is not liable for its misuse, since it was not consecrated in a service vessel. Once one places the water from the jug for libation into the flask, which is a service vessel, the water is consecrated and he is liable for misusing the water. With regard to the willow branches that are placed on the sides of the altar on the festival of Sukkot, before their placement one may not derive benefit from them ab initio, but if he derived benefit from them he is not liable for their misuse. After their placement their mitzva has been fulfilled, and therefore at that time one may derive benefit from the willow branches ab initio. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says: The elders were accustomed to derive benefit from the willow branches even before their placement on the sides of the altar, by cutting small branches for use in their lulav, in fulfillment of the mitzva of the four species.
With regard to a bird’s nest that is atop the consecrated tree, one may not derive benefit from it ab initio, but if one derived benefit from it he is not liable for its misuse. In order to acquire a bird’s nest that is atop a tree worshipped as idolatry, from which one may not derive benefit even by climbing it, one should dislodge the nest from its place by striking it with a pole. In the case of one who consecrates his forest, one is liable for misusing everything in the entire forest. In the case of the Temple treasurers who purchased non-sacred logs to use for repairs in the Temple, one is liable for misusing the wood itself, but one is not liable for misusing the sawdust, nor is he liable for the leaves [baneviyya] that fall from the log, as the treasurers purchased for the Temple only those materials fit for use in its construction.
וְלַד חַטָּאת וּתְמוּרַת חַטָּאת וְחַטָּאת שֶׁמֵּתוּ בְעָלֶיהָ, יָמוּתוּ. שֶׁעָבְרָה שְׁנָתָהּ, וְשֶׁאָבְדָה וְשֶׁנִּמְצֵאת בַּעֲלַת מוּם, אִם מִשֶּׁכִּפְּרוּ הַבְּעָלִים, תָּמוּת, וְאֵינָהּ עוֹשָׂה תְמוּרָה, וְלֹא נֶהֱנִים, וְלֹא מוֹעֲלִין. וְאִם עַד שֶׁלֹּא כִפְּרוּ הַבְּעָלִים, תִּרְעֶה עַד שֶׁתִּסְתָּאֵב, וְתִמָּכֵר, וְיָבִיא בְדָמֶיהָ אַחֶרֶת, וְעוֹשָׂה תְמוּרָה, וּמוֹעֲלִים בָּהּ:
This mishna, which also appears in tractate Temura, deals with the five sin offerings left to die. It is cited here because of its relevance to the halakhot of misuse. The mishna first mentions three of those offerings: The offspring of a sin offering, and an animal that is the substitute for a sin offering, whether or not the owners achieved atonement by means of another offering, and a sin offering whose owners have died before the offering was sacrificed, shall die. And the other two sin offerings left to die are the sin offering whose year since birth passed and is therefore unfit for sacrifice, and a sin offering that was lost and when it was found it was blemished, with regard to which the halakhot are as follows: If the sin offering was found after the owner achieved atonement through the sacrifice of another animal as a sin offering, then the blemished animal shall die, and it does not render a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute, as it is has neither inherent sanctity, which would make it fit for sacrifice on the altar, nor sanctity that inheres in its value. And one may not derive benefit from the found animal ab initio, but if he derived benefit from the animal he is not liable for its misuse. And if the animal whose year passed was found before the owner achieved atonement, the found animal shall graze until it becomes blemished [shetista’ev], at which point it may not be sacrificed; and it shall be sold and the owner shall purchase another animal with the money received from its sale. The animal that was found blemished may be sold immediately, and the owner shall purchase another animal with the money received from its sale. In both cases, the animal renders a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute, and one who derives benefit from it is liable for misusing it.
הַמַּפְרִישׁ מָעוֹת לִנְזִירוּתוֹ, לֹא נֶהֱנִין וְלֹא מוֹעֲלִין, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן רְאוּיִין לָבֹא כֻלָּן שְׁלָמִים. מֵת, הָיוּ סְתוּמִים, יִפְּלוּ לִנְדָבָה. הָיוּ מְפֹרָשִׁים, דְּמֵי חַטָּאת יֵלְכוּ לְיָם הַמֶּלַח, לֹא נֶהֱנִים וְלֹא מוֹעֲלִין בָּהֶן. דְּמֵי עוֹלָה, יָבִיאוּ עוֹלָה וּמוֹעֲלִין בָּהֶן. וּדְמֵי שְׁלָמִים, יָבִיאוּ שְׁלָמִים, וְנֶאֱכָלִים לְיוֹם אֶחָד, וְאֵינָן טְעוּנִין לָחֶם:
In the case of a nazirite who designated money for the three offerings he is obligated to bring upon completion of his naziriteship, a sin offering, a burnt offering, and a peace offering, but he did not specify which money was designated for which offering, since it is not clear what the money is intended for, one may not derive benefit from the money ab initio, but if he derived benefit from the money he is not liable for its misuse. This is due to the fact that all the money is fit for purchase of the peace offering, for which one is liable for misuse only after its blood is sprinkled, and therefore there is no liability for its misuse. If the nazirite died and he had undesignated funds, meaning he did not specify which money was for each of the three offerings, all the money will be allocated for purchase of communal gift offerings. If the nazirite died and he had specified money, the money specified for purchase of the sin offering shall go to the Dead Sea for disposal, because one may not derive benefit ab initio from the money of a sin offering whose owner has died. But if it was not disposed of, and one derived benefit from the money, he is not liable for its misuse. With the money specified for purchase of the burnt offering, one shall bring a gift burnt offering, and one is liable for misusing the funds. With the money specified for purchase of the peace offering, one shall bring a gift peace offering. Although it is a gift offering, the restrictions of the peace offering of the naziriteship apply, and therefore it is eaten for one day and that same night, not the standard two days and one night of a regular peace offering. And nevertheless the peace offering does not require the bringing of the loaves that accompany the peace offering of naziriteship, as it is written with regard to the loaves: “And shall place them on the hands of the nazirite” (Numbers 6:19), and in this case the nazirite is dead.
רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר, הַדָּם, קַל בִּתְחִלָּתוֹ וְחָמוּר בְּסוֹפוֹ, וְהַנְּסָכִים, חֹמֶר בִּתְחִלָּתָן וְקַל בְּסוֹפָן. הַדָּם, בַּתְּחִלָּה אֵין מוֹעֲלִים בּוֹ. יָצָא לְנַחַל קִדְרוֹן, מוֹעֲלִים בּוֹ. הַנְּסָכִים, בַּתְּחִלָּה מוֹעֲלִים בָּהֶן. יָצְאוּ לַשִּׁיתִין, אֵין מוֹעֲלִים בָּהֶם:
Rabbi Shimon says: With regard to misuse of the blood of offerings that is to be sprinkled on the altar, the halakha is lenient with regard to the status of the blood at the outset and stringent at its conclusion. With regard to misuse of the wine of the libations that accompany the offerings, the halakha is stringent with regard to the status of the wine at their outset and lenient at their conclusion. The mishna explains: With regard to blood, at its outset, before it is sprinkled on the altar, one is not liable for misusing it; but once its remainder has been poured on the base of the altar and it emerges via the canal that runs through the Temple to the Kidron Valley at the foot of the Temple Mount, one is liable for misusing it. With regard to libations, at their outset, from the moment they were consecrated, one is liable for misusing them, but once they have descended to the drainpipes built into the altar and which extend beneath it, through which the libations flowed out of the Temple, one is no longer liable for misusing them, as their mitzva was fulfilled and therefore their sanctity has ceased.
דִּשּׁוּן מִזְבֵּחַ הַפְּנִימִי וְהַמְּנוֹרָה, לֹא נֶהֱנִין וְלֹא מוֹעֲלִין. הַמַּקְדִּישׁ דִּשּׁוּן בַּתְּחִלָּה, מוֹעֲלִים בּוֹ. תּוֹרִים שֶׁלֹּא הִגִּיעַ זְמַנָּן, וּבְנֵי יוֹנָה שֶׁעָבַר זְמַנָּן, לֹא נֶהֱנִים וְלֹא מוֹעֲלִים. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר, תּוֹרִין שֶׁלֹּא הִגִּיעַ זְמַנָּן, מוֹעֲלִין בָּהֶן. וּבְנֵי יוֹנָה שֶׁעָבַר זְמַנָּן, לֹא נֶהֱנִין וְלֹא מוֹעֲלִין:
With regard to the removal of ash from the inner altar to the place where the ashes lifted from the outer altar are deposited, and similarly with regard to the wicks of the Candelabrum, one may not derive benefit from them ab initio; but if one derived benefit from them he is not liable for their misuse. In the case of one who consecrates anew the ash that has been removed, he is liable for misusing it. With regard to doves whose time of fitness for sacrifice has not arrived, as they are too young, and pigeons whose time of fitness for sacrifice has passed, as they are too old, one may not derive benefit from them ab initio; but if one derived benefit from them he is not liable for their misuse. The previous [mishna] teaches that one may not derive benefit from doves whose time of fitness for sacrifice has not arrived and from pigeons whose time of fitness for sacrifice has passed, but one who derived benefit from them is not liable for their misuse. Rabbi Shimon disagrees with this ruling and says: With regard to doves whose time of fitness for sacrifice has not arrived, one is liable for misusing them. With regard to pigeons whose time of fitness for sacrifice has passed, one may not derive benefit ab initio, but if one derived benefit from them he is not liable for their misuse.
חֲלֵב הַמֻּקְדָּשִׁין וּבֵיצֵי תוֹרִין, לֹא נֶהֱנִין וְלֹא מוֹעֲלִים. בַּמֶּה דְבָרִים אֲמוּרִים, בְּקָדְשֵׁי מִזְבֵּחַ. אֲבָל בְּקָדְשֵׁי בֶדֶק הַבַּיִת, הִקְדִּישׁ תַּרְנְגֹלֶת, מוֹעֲלִין בָּהּ וּבְבֵיצָתָהּ. חֲמוֹר, מוֹעֲלִין בָּהּ וּבַחֲלָבָהּ:
With regard to the milk of sacrificial animals and the eggs of sacrificial doves, one may not derive benefit from them ab initio, but if one derived benefit from them after the fact he is not liable for their misuse. In what case is this statement, that if one derived benefit from the eggs or milk of sacrificial animals, he is not liable for their misuse, said? It is stated in the case of sacrificial animals offered on the altar, as their eggs and milk are not brought to the altar and therefore they are considered distinct from the offerings themselves. But this is not the halakha in the case of animals that are not sacrificed and are consecrated only for Temple maintenance. For example, if one consecrated a hen he is liable for misusing it and for misusing its egg; if one consecrated a donkey he is liable for misusing it and for misusing its milk, as the animal and its milk, and likewise the hen and its eggs, are both consecrated for Temple maintenance and are deemed a single unit.
כָּל הָרָאוּי לַמִּזְבֵּחַ וְלֹא לְבֶדֶק הַבַּיִת, לְבֶדֶק הַבַּיִת וְלֹא לַמִּזְבֵּחַ, לֹא לַמִּזְבֵּחַ וְלֹא לְבֶדֶק הַבַּיִת, מוֹעֲלִין בּוֹ. כֵּיצַד, הִקְדִּישׁ בּוֹר מָלֵא מַיִם, אַשְׁפָּה מְלֵאָה זֶבֶל, שׁוֹבָךְ מָלֵא יוֹנִים, אִילָן מָלֵא פֵרוֹת, שָׂדֶה מְלֵאָה עֲשָׂבִים, מוֹעֲלִין בָּהֶם וּבְמַה שֶּׁבְּתוֹכָן. אֲבָל אִם הִקְדִּישׁ בּוֹר וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִתְמַלֵּא מַיִם, אַשְׁפָּה וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִתְמַלְאָה זֶבֶל, שׁוֹבָךְ וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִתְמַלֵּא יוֹנִים, אִילָן וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִתְמַלֵּא פֵרוֹת, שָׂדֶה וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִתְמַלְאָה עֲשָׂבִים, מוֹעֲלִין בָּהֶן, וְאֵין מוֹעֲלִין בְּמַה שֶּׁבְּתוֹכָן, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה. וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר, הַמַּקְדִּישׁ שָׂדֶה וְאִילָן, מוֹעֲלִין בָּהֶם וּבְגִדּוּלֵיהֶם, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן גִּדּוּלֵי הֶקְדֵּשׁ. וְלַד מְעֻשֶּׂרֶת לֹא יִינַק מִן הַמְעֻשֶּׂרֶת. וַאֲחֵרִים מִתְנַדְּבִים כֵּן. וְלַד מֻקְדָּשִׁין לֹא יִינַק מִן הַמֻּקְדָּשִׁין. וַאֲחֵרִים מִתְנַדְּבִים כֵּן. הַפּוֹעֲלִים לֹא יֹאכְלוּ מִגְּרוֹגָרוֹת שֶׁל הֶקְדֵּשׁ. וְכֵן פָּרָה לֹא תֹאכַל מִכַּרְשִׁינֵי הֶקְדֵּשׁ:
With regard to any consecrated item that is fit for sacrifice on the altar but is not fit for Temple maintenance, or if it is fit for Temple maintenance but not for sacrifice on the altar, or fit neither for the altar nor for Temple maintenance, nevertheless one is liable for misusing it. The mishna clarifies each of these categories: Fit for Temple maintenance but not for sacrifice on the altar, how so? In a case where one consecrated a cistern full of water, the water is not fit for sacrifice on the altar, as only water from the Siloam pool is used for the altar. Nevertheless, it is fit for Temple maintenance, e.g., to knead clay with it for use in reinforcing the walls of the Temple. What is the case of an item fit neither for the altar nor for Temple maintenance? If one consecrated garbage dumps full of manure, the place and its contents are fit neither for the altar nor for Temple maintenance. Rather, they are sold and the money received from the sale is donated to the Temple. What is the case of an item fit for sacrifice on the altar but not fit for Temple maintenance? If one consecrated a dovecote full of pigeons, the pigeons are fit for the altar while the dovecote is not fit even for Temple maintenance. Or if one consecrated a tree full of fruit, as the fruit is fit for the altar whereas the tree is not fit even for Temple maintenance. For example, grapes are fit for the altar as wine, but the vines are not fit for Temple maintenance, as they are too flimsy for construction. Another case where the consecrated item is fit for neither the altar nor Temple maintenance is a field full of grass. In all those cases, one is liable for misusing both them and that which is within them, as those that are unfit for use in the Temple will be sold and their money will be used for the altar or for Temple maintenance. But if one consecrated an empty cistern and it was subsequently filled with water, or if one consecrated an empty garbage dump and it was subsequently filled with manure, or an empty dovecote and it was subsequently filled with pigeons, or a tree without fruit and it was subsequently filled with fruit, or an empty field and it was subsequently filled with grass; in all these cases one is liable for misusing them but one is not liable for misusing that which is within them. There is no misuse with regard to enhancements that developed in consecrated property. Rabbi Yosei disagrees in two of the above cases and says: In the case of one who consecrates the empty field in which grass grew or the empty tree on which fruit grew, he is liable for misusing both them and their growth, because these are growths of consecrated property, despite the fact that they grew there only after the property was consecrated. Apropos the growths of consecrated property, the mishna states that an offspring born to a tithed animal before it was tithed may not be given to suckle from the tithed mother, as it is a non-sacred animal that may not be allowed to derive benefit from consecrated property. And there are others who stipulate in this manner, i.e., that the consecration does not apply to the milk. The same is true of the offspring of sacrificial animals born to them before their consecration; they may not suckle from the sacrificial animal. And in this case as well, there are others who stipulate in this manner, i.e., to enable the offspring to suckle. The laborers, who are generally permitted to eat the food of their employer, may not eat from consecrated dried figs, if they work with Temple produce. Rather, they can buy food with the money they are paid. And likewise, a cow working with consecrated property, e.g., threshing Temple produce, may not eat from consecrated vetch [mikarshinei].
שָׁרְשֵׁי אִילָן שֶׁל הֶדְיוֹט בָּאִין בְּשֶׁל הֶקְדֵּשׁ וְשֶׁל הֶקְדֵּשׁ בָּאִין בְּשֶׁל הֶדְיוֹט, לֹא נֶהֱנִין וְלֹא מוֹעֲלִין. הַמַּעְיָן שֶׁהוּא יוֹצֵא מִתּוֹךְ שְׂדֵה הֶקְדֵּשׁ, לֹא נֶהֱנִין וְלֹא מוֹעֲלִין. יָצָא חוּץ לַשָּׂדֶה, נֶהֱנִין מִמֶּנּוּ. הַמַּיִם שֶׁבְּכַד שֶׁל זָהָב, לֹא נֶהֱנִין וְלֹא מוֹעֲלִין. נִתְּנוּ בִצְלוֹחִית, מוֹעֲלִין בָּהֶם. עֲרָבָה, לֹא נֶהֱנִין וְלֹא מוֹעֲלִין. רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי צָדוֹק אוֹמֵר, נוֹתְנִין הָיוּ מִמֶּנָּה זְקֵנִים בְּלוּלְבֵיהֶם:
With regard to the roots of the non-sacred tree of an ordinary person that enter into consecrated land, and the roots of a consecrated tree that enter into the non-sacred land of an ordinary person, one may not derive benefit from them ab initio, but if he derived benefit from them he is not liable for their misuse. With regard to water of a spring that flows in a non-sacred field but which emerges from that field and flows into a consecrated field, when it is in the consecrated field one may not derive benefit from it ab initio, but if one derived benefit from it he is not liable for its misuse. Once the spring emerges outside the consecrated field one may derive benefit from the water. With regard to the water that was drawn from the Siloam pool into the golden jug, which was not consecrated as a service vessel, to bring it to the altar for libation on the festival of Sukkot, one may not derive benefit from the water ab initio, as it was drawn for use in the Temple service. But if one derived benefit from it he is not liable for its misuse, since it was not consecrated in a service vessel. Once one places the water from the jug for libation into the flask, which is a service vessel, the water is consecrated and he is liable for misusing the water. With regard to the willow branches that are placed on the sides of the altar on the festival of Sukkot, before their placement one may not derive benefit from them ab initio, but if he derived benefit from them he is not liable for their misuse. After their placement their mitzva has been fulfilled, and therefore at that time one may derive benefit from the willow branches ab initio. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says: The elders were accustomed to derive benefit from the willow branches even before their placement on the sides of the altar, by cutting small branches for use in their lulav, in fulfillment of the mitzva of the four species.
קֵן שֶׁבְּרֹאשׁ הָאִילָן שֶׁל הֶקְדֵּשׁ, לֹא נֶהֱנִין וְלֹא מוֹעֲלִין. שֶׁבַּאֲשֵׁרָה, יַתִּיז בְּקָנֶה. הַמַּקְדִּישׁ אֶת הַחֹרֶשׁ, מוֹעֲלִין בְּכֻלּוֹ. הַגִּזְבָּרִים שֶׁלָּקְחוּ אֶת הָעֵצִים, מוֹעֲלִין בָּעֵצִים, וְאֵין מוֹעֲלִין לֹא בַשִּׁפּוּי וְלֹא בַנְּוִיָּה:
With regard to a bird’s nest that is atop the consecrated tree, one may not derive benefit from it ab initio, but if one derived benefit from it he is not liable for its misuse. In order to acquire a bird’s nest that is atop a tree worshipped as idolatry, from which one may not derive benefit even by climbing it, one should dislodge the nest from its place by striking it with a pole. In the case of one who consecrates his forest, one is liable for misusing everything in the entire forest. In the case of the Temple treasurers who purchased non-sacred logs to use for repairs in the Temple, one is liable for misusing the wood itself, but one is not liable for misusing the sawdust, nor is he liable for the leaves [baneviyya] that fall from the log, as the treasurers purchased for the Temple only those materials fit for use in its construction.