(Exodus 22:9) "If a man give to his neighbor an ass or an ox or a lamb, etc." R. Yishmael says: He must deposit it with him, explicitly, saying "Here, watch this for me"; but if he just says "Keep an eye on it," he is not liable.
"an ass or an ox or a lamb": This tells me only of these. Whence am I to derive all beasts (as included)? From all beasts to watch." For wherever the general adds to the particular, all are included. Then let only that (the general) be stated. Why need the others be specified? In that case I would say that he is not liable until he deposits all of them with him. It is, therefore, written "an ass or an ox or a lamb," to make him liable for each individually.
"and it die": at the hands of Heaven. "or be broken": by an animal. "or be seized": by robbers. I might think "or be broken," "or be seized," (that he is not liable) whether or not he could rescue it; it is, therefore, written "and it die." Just as death is characterized by insusceptibility to rescue, so, (only) in all such instances he is not liable. These are the words of R. Eliezer.
R. Akiva said to him: You are deriving what is possible from what is impossible. For it is impossible for (natural) death not to be at the hands of Heaven; but breaking and seizing may be either at the hands of Heaven or at the hands of man — whereupon R. Eliezer reversed himself and derived them from stealing (i.e., According to the parameters whereby he [a hired watcher] is liable for stealing, he is liable for them.)
R. Shimon says: (Ibid. 12) "For the torn (beast) he shall not pay." There is a torn beast for which he does pay, and there is a torn (beast) for which he does not pay, as when it was torn by a lion.)
(22:9) "no one seeing": Scripture here speaks of (the absence of) witnesses. "no one seeing, (10) the oath of the L–rd shall be between the two of them (that he did not send his hand against the deposit of his neighbor.") But if there are witnesses (that he is speaking the truth), the watcher is exempt from all (payment).
"the oath of the L–rd (Yod-Keh) shall be between the two of them": by Yod-Keh. From here you derive the same for all "oaths" in the Torah. Since all the "oaths in the Torah are unqualified (as to the formula for the oath), and the Torah qualified an oath in one instance as being "Yod-Keh," so all the oaths in the Torah must be by "Yod-Keh."
(22:10) ("The oath of the L–rd shall be) between the two of them": to exclude the heirs. "between the two of them": to include an oath (obtaining) in an instance in which the other is suspect (i.e., if one is suspect, the other swears and takes.) "between the two of them": to exclude the judge — that he not make him swear against his will. R. Nathan says: "between the two of them": We are hereby apprised that the oath devolves upon the two of them.
"that he did not send his hand against the deposit of his neighbor": (See Section 15) "and its owner shall accept, and he (the watcher) shall not pay": From here it is derived that all who swear (by Torah mandate), swear and do not pay.
(Exodus 22:11) "And if it were stolen from him, he shall pay its owner": This speaks of a hired watcher, and the above (Ibid. 9-10), of a non-paid watcher. But perhaps the reverse is the case? It follows (otherwise), viz.: A watcher (here) is liable (for theft) and a hirer (of a beast) is liable (viz. Ibid. 14). Just as a hirer (is liable) because he derives benefit (from the beast), so it is a hired watcher, who derives benefit (i.e., payment) — to exclude a non-paid watcher, who does not derive benefit.
"And if stolen it shall be stolen from him": This tells me only of stealing. Whence do we derive the same for loss (of the beast)? It follows, viz.: Its being stolen involves a lapse in watching, and its being lost involves a lapse in watching. If you have learned that he is liable for the first, so, should he be liable for the second.
"if stolen it shall be stolen": R. Yossi says: By this (redundancy) loss is included. "from him": to exclude (liability for the watcher if he, in turn, give it to) his shepherd-boy (from who it was stolen), and to include (such liability for) a grown shepherd (whom he hired as a keeper).
(Exodus 22:12) "If it were torn (by a wild beast), let him bring ed." This ("ed") is its hide. These are the words of R. Yoshiyah. Even though there is no proof for this (interpretation), there is support for it in (Amos 3:12) "Just as a shepherd can rescue from the mouth of a lion (just) two legs or the cartilage of an ear, etc." R. Yochanan b. Yoshiyah says: "If it were torn, let him bring ed." — Let him bring witnesses ("edim") that it was torn, and he will be exempt from paying.
Which is a torn beast for which he does pay? A beast torn by a cat, a fox, or a marten. Likewise, wherever it is possible for him to rescue (the beast, and he does not), he is liable to pay.
And which is a torn beast for which he does not pay? A beast torn by a wolf, a lion, a bear, a tiger, a leopard, or a snake. Since the Torah writes (9) "and it die, just as he is not liable to pay in an instance of (natural) death, so, in all instances where he cannot rescue the beast, he is not liable to pay. Thus, "For the torn beast he shall not pay."
(Exodus 22:13) "And if a man borrow from his neighbor": Scripture "cuts off" a borrower from the class of "watcher," and treats it (as a class) in itself. "from his neighbor": We are hereby taught that he (the borrower) is not liable until he removes it from the lender's domain.
"and it be broken or die": This tells me only of (a borrower's liability for) breaking or death. Whence do I derive (the same for) seizure? "death" is written here, and it is written elsewhere (9). Just as seizure there is juxtaposed with death, so, here (seizure is understood to be juxtaposed with death.)
Whence do I derive (the same for) theft and loss? It follows a fortiori, viz.: If a hired watcher, who is not liable for death, is liable for theft and loss, then a borrower, who is liable for death, how much more so should he be liable for theft and loss!
(13) "if its owner were not with him, pay shall he pay. (14) If its owner were with him, he (the borrower) shall not pay": From the first (13), do I not know the second (14)? (Why, then, need it be written?)
To teach that if it went from the domain of the lender to that of the borrower even for one moment, then (if the beast were) with the owner, he (the borrower) is not liable; if it were not with the owner, he is liable.
"If it (the beast) were hired, it came by its hire (into the hands of the hirer"): I might think that if he swears (viz. Ibid. 10), he is exempt from all payment, you, therefore, reason: Since a paid watcher gives benefit (to the owner) and a hirer gives benefit, and we have learned about a paid watcher, who swears (to exempt himself from liability) for accident, that he pays for theft and loss — then a hirer, too, pays for theft and loss.
Would you say that? There is a crucial difference (between a paid and an unpaid watcher), viz.: Since a paid watcher both derives benefit and gives benefit, and a hirer derives benefit and gives benefit, then the second is to be compared to the first, who swears (for exemption from liability) for accident and pays for theft and loss, and this is not to be refuted by an unpaid watcher, who gives benefit but does not derive it. This is the intent of "If it were hired, it came by its hire" (i.e., it is to be compared to a hired watcher and not to an unhired one.)
(שמות כב,ט) "כִּי יִתֵּן אִישׁ אֶל רֵעֵהוּ חֲמוֹר, אוֹ שׁוֹר, אוֹ שֶׂה, וְכָל בְּהֵמָה לִשְׁמֹר, וּמֵת אוֹ נִשְׁבַּר אוֹ נִשְׁבָּה אֵין רֹאֶה." רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר: עַד שֶׁיַּפְקִיד אֶצְלוֹ וְיֹאמַר לוֹ 'הָא לָךְ, שְׁמֹר לִי זֶה!' אֲבָל אִם אָמַר לוֹ 'עֵינֶיךָ בּוֹ', הֲרֵי זֶה פָטוּר.
(Exodus 22:9) "If a man give to his neighbor an ass or an ox or a lamb, etc." R. Yishmael says: He must deposit it with him, explicitly, saying "Here, watch this for me"; but if he just says "Keep an eye on it," he is not liable.
"חֲמוֹר אוֹ שׁוֹר אוֹ שֶׂה", אֵין לִי אֶלָּא חֲמוֹר וְשׁוֹר וְשֶׂה, שְׁאָר כָּל בְּהֵמָה מְנַיִן? תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר "וְכָל בְּהֵמָה לִשְׁמֹר". אֲנִי אֶקְרָא "וְכָל בְּהֵמָה", וּמַה תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר "חֲמוֹר אוֹ שׁוֹר אוֹ שֶׂה"? אִם אֲנִי קוֹרֵא "וְכָל בְּהֵמָה", שׁוֹמֵעַ אֲנִי, לֹא יִהְיֶה חַיָּב עַד שֶׁיַּפְקִיד אֶצְלוֹ כָּל בְּהֵמָה! תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר "חֲמוֹר אוֹ שׁוֹר אוֹ שֶׂה", לְחַיֵּב עַל זֶה בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ וְעַל זֶה בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ. וּמַה תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר "וְכָל בְּהֵמָה"? אֶלָּא בָּא הַכָּתוּב לְלַמְּדָךְ, שֶׁכָּל הַכְּלָל שֶׁהוּא מוֹסִיף עַל הַפְּרָט, הַכֹּל בִּכְלָלוֹ.
"an ass or an ox or a lamb": This tells me only of these. Whence am I to derive all beasts (as included)? From all beasts to watch." For wherever the general adds to the particular, all are included. Then let only that (the general) be stated. Why need the others be specified? In that case I would say that he is not liable until he deposits all of them with him. It is, therefore, written "an ass or an ox or a lamb," to make him liable for each individually.
"וּמֵת", שֶׁתְּהֵי מִיתָתוֹ בִּידֵי שָׁמַיִם; "אוֹ נִשְׁבַּר", שֶׁשִּׁבְּרַתּוּ חָיָה; "אוֹ נִשְׁבָּה", שֶׁשָּׁבוּהוּ לֶסְטִים. עֲדַיִן אֲנִי אוֹמֵר: הַשֶּׁבֶר וְהַשְּׁבִי, בֵּין שֶׁהוּא יָכֹל לְהַצִּיל, וּבֵין שֶׁאֵינוֹ יָכֹל לְהַצִּיל! תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר "וּמֵת". מַה מִּיתָה מְיֻחֶדֶת, שֶׁאֵי אֶפְשָׁר לוֹ לְהַצִּילָהּ, פָּטוּר מִלְּשַׁלֵּם, אַף כָּל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵי אֶפְשָׁר לוֹ לְהַצִּילוֹ, פָּטוּר מִלְּשַׁלֵּם. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר.
"and it die": at the hands of Heaven. "or be broken": by an animal. "or be seized": by robbers. I might think "or be broken," "or be seized," (that he is not liable) whether or not he could rescue it; it is, therefore, written "and it die." Just as death is characterized by insusceptibility to rescue, so, (only) in all such instances he is not liable. These are the words of R. Eliezer.
אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָה: רַבִּי! אַתְּ דָּן אֶפְשָׁר מִשֶּׁאֵי אֶפְשָׁר! שֶׁאֵי אֶפְשָׁר לַמִּיתָה לִהְיוֹת אֶלָּא בִּידֵי שָׁמַיִם, אֲבָל הַשֶּׁבֶר וְהַשְּׁבִי, אֶפְשָׁר לוֹ לִהְיוֹת בֵּין בִּידֵי שָׁמַיִם וּבֵין בִּידֵי אָדָם! חָזַר וְדָנָן כְּמִין גְּנֵבָה.
R. Akiva said to him: You are deriving what is possible from what is impossible. For it is impossible for (natural) death not to be at the hands of Heaven; but breaking and seizing may be either at the hands of Heaven or at the hands of man — whereupon R. Eliezer reversed himself and derived them from stealing (i.e., According to the parameters whereby he [a hired watcher] is liable for stealing, he is liable for them.)
רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר: (שמות כב,יב) "הַטְּרֵפָה לֹא יְשַׁלֵּם", יֵשׁ טְרֵפָה שֶׁהוּא מְשַׁלֵּם, וְיֵשׁ טְרֵפָה שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם.
R. Shimon says: (Ibid. 12) "For the torn (beast) he shall not pay." There is a torn beast for which he does pay, and there is a torn (beast) for which he does not pay, as when it was torn by a lion.)
"אֵין רֹאֶה." בָּעֵדִים הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר. "אֵין רֹאֶה. שְׁבֻעַת יי תִּהְיֶה בֵּין שְׁנֵיהֶם". הָא אִם יֵשׁ רוֹאֶה, בַּעַל הַבַּיִת פָּטוּר מִכָּל דָּבָר.
(22:9) "no one seeing": Scripture here speaks of (the absence of) witnesses. "no one seeing, (10) the oath of the L–rd shall be between the two of them (that he did not send his hand against the deposit of his neighbor.") But if there are witnesses (that he is speaking the truth), the watcher is exempt from all (payment).
(שמות כב,י) "שְׁבֻעַת יי תִּהְיֶה בֵּין שְׁנֵיהֶם, אִם לֹא שָׁלַח יָדוֹ בִּמְלֶאכֶת רֵעֵהוּ, וְלָקַח בְּעָלָיו וְלֹא יְשַׁלֵּם." בְּיוֹ"ד הֵ"י. מִכָּן אַתְּ דָּן כָּל הַשְּׁבוּעוֹת שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה: הוֹאִיל וְנֶאֶמְרוּ כָּל הַשְּׁבוּעוֹת שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה סְתָם, וּפָרַט בְּאַחַת מֵהֶן, שֶׁאֵינָהּ אֶלָּא בְיוֹ"ד הֵ"י, פּוֹרֵט אֲנִי כָל שְׁבוּעוֹת שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה, שֶׁאֵינָן אֶלָּא בְיוֹ"ד הֵ"י.
"the oath of the L–rd (Yod-Keh) shall be between the two of them": by Yod-Keh. From here you derive the same for all "oaths" in the Torah. Since all the "oaths in the Torah are unqualified (as to the formula for the oath), and the Torah qualified an oath in one instance as being "Yod-Keh," so all the oaths in the Torah must be by "Yod-Keh."
"בֵּין שְׁנֵיהֶם", לְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַיּוֹרֵשׁ; "בֵּין שְׁנֵיהֶם", לְהוֹצִיא אֶת שֶׁכְּנֶגְדּוֹ חָשׁוּד עַל הַשְּׁבוּעָה; "בֵּין שְׁנֵיהֶם", שֶׁלֹּא יַשְׁבִּיעֶנּוּ הַדַּיָּן עַל כָּרְחוֹ. רַבִּי נָתָן אוֹמֵר: "שְׁבֻעַת יי תִּהְיֶה בֵּין שְׁנֵיהֶם". מַגִּיד שֶׁשְּׁבוּעָה חָלָה עַל שְׁנֵיהֶם.
(22:10) ("The oath of the L–rd shall be) between the two of them": to exclude the heirs. "between the two of them": to include an oath (obtaining) in an instance in which the other is suspect (i.e., if one is suspect, the other swears and takes.) "between the two of them": to exclude the judge — that he not make him swear against his will. R. Nathan says: "between the two of them": We are hereby apprised that the oath devolves upon the two of them.
"אִם לֹא שָׁלַח יָדוֹ בִּמְלֶאכֶת רֵעֵהוּ", לְצָרְכָהּ. אַתָּה אוֹמֵר לְצָרְכָהּ, אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא לְצָרְכָהּ וְשֶׁלֹּא לְצָרְכָהּ? הֲרֵי אֲנִי דָן: נֶאֱמַר כָּן שְׁלִיחוּת יָד, וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן שְׁלִיחוּת יָד. מַה כָּן שְׁבוּעָה, אַף לְהַלָּן שְׁבוּעָה; מַה כָּן בְּיוֹ"ד הֵ"י, אַף לְהַלָּן בְּיוֹ"ד הֵ"י; מַה לְּהַלָּן בְּבֵית דִּין, אַף כָּן בְּבֵית דִּין; מַה לְּהַלָּן לְצָרְכָהּ, אַף כָּן לְצָרְכָהּ; מַה לְּהַלָּן "עַל כָּל דְּבַר פֶּשַׁע", אַף כָּן "עַל כָּל דְּבַר פֶּשַׁע".
"that he did not send his hand against the deposit of his neighbor": (See Section 15) "and its owner shall accept, and he (the watcher) shall not pay": From here it is derived that all who swear (by Torah mandate), swear and do not pay.
"וְלָקַח בְּעָלָיו וְלֹא יְשַׁלֵּם." מִכָּן אָמָרוּ: בַּעַל הַנְּבֵלָה מְטַפֵּל בְּנִבְלָתוֹ.
"and its owner shall take": From here they ruled: The owner of the carcass must attend to his carcass.
(שמות כב,יא) "וְאִם גָּנֹב יִגָּנֵב מֵעִמּוֹ, יְשַׁלֵּם לִבְעָלָיו." זֶה שׁוֹמֵר שָׁכָר, וְהָעֶלְיוֹן שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם.*הָעֶלְיוֹן: המוזכר למעלה. אַתָּה אוֹמֵר זֶה שׁוֹמֵר שָׁכָר, וְהָעֶלְיוֹן שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם, אוֹ זֶה שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם, וְהָעֶלְיוֹן שׁוֹמֵר שָׁכָר? הֲרֵי אַתְּ דָּן: הוֹאִיל וְהַשָּׂכִיר חַיָּב, וְהַשּׁוֹמֵר חַיָּב, מַה שָּׂכִיר, שָׂכִיר שֶׁהוּא נֶהֱנֶה, אַף שׁוֹמֵר, שׁוֹמֵר שֶׁהוּא נֶהֱנֶה. יָצָא שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם, שֶׁאֵינוֹ נֶהֱנֶה.
(Exodus 22:11) "And if it were stolen from him, he shall pay its owner": This speaks of a hired watcher, and the above (Ibid. 9-10), of a non-paid watcher. But perhaps the reverse is the case? It follows (otherwise), viz.: A watcher (here) is liable (for theft) and a hirer (of a beast) is liable (viz. Ibid. 14). Just as a hirer (is liable) because he derives benefit (from the beast), so it is a hired watcher, who derives benefit (i.e., payment) — to exclude a non-paid watcher, who does not derive benefit.
הָא אֵין עָלֶיךָ לוֹמַר כַּלָּשׁוֹן הָאַחֲרוֹן, אֶלָּא כַּלָּשׁוֹן הָרִאשׁוֹן: וְזֶה שׁוֹמֵר שָׁכָר, וְהָעֶלְיוֹן שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם.
It is not the second assumption, then, which is to be posited, but the first — this speaks of a hired watcher, and the above, of a non-paid watcher.
"וְאִם גָּנֹב יִגָּנֵב", אֵין לִי אֶלָּא גְנֵבָה, אֲבֵדָה מְנַיִן? הֲרֵי אַתְּ דָּן: הוֹאִיל וּגְנֵבָה חֶסְרוֹן שְׁמִירָה, וַאֲבֵדָה חֶסְרוֹן שְׁמִירָה, אִם לָמַדְתָּ עַל גְּנֵבָה, שֶׁחַיָּב לְשַׁלֵּם, אַף אֲבֵדָה יְהֵי חַיָּב לְשַׁלֵּם.
"And if stolen it shall be stolen from him": This tells me only of stealing. Whence do we derive the same for loss (of the beast)? It follows, viz.: Its being stolen involves a lapse in watching, and its being lost involves a lapse in watching. If you have learned that he is liable for the first, so, should he be liable for the second.
רַבִּי יוֹסֵה הַגָּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: "גָּנֹב יִגָּנֵב", לְהָבִיא אֶת הַגַּנָּב. "מֵעִמּוֹ", לְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַצּוֹעֵר,*הַצּוֹעֵר: רועה ראשי, כרזילא. "מֵעִמּוֹ", לְהָבִיא אֶת הַנּוֹקֵד.*הַנּוֹקֵד: הרועה.
"if stolen it shall be stolen": R. Yossi says: By this (redundancy) loss is included. "from him": to exclude (liability for the watcher if he, in turn, give it to) his shepherd-boy (from who it was stolen), and to include (such liability for) a grown shepherd (whom he hired as a keeper).
(שמות כב,יב) ["אִם טָרֹף יִטָּרֵף, יְבִאֵהוּ עֵד, הַטְּרֵפָה לֹא יְשַׁלֵּם."] "אִם טָרֹף יִטָּרֵף", זֶה עֵדֶר. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּהוּ. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין רְאָיָה לַדָּבָר, זֵכֶר הוּא: (עמוס ג,יב) "כֹּה אָמַר יי: כַּאֲשֶׁר יַצִּיל הָרֹעֶה מִפִּי הָאֲרִי שְׁתֵּי כְרָעַיִם אוֹ בְדַל אֹזֶן, כֵּן יִנָּצְלוּ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל הַיֹּשְׁבִים בְּשֹׁמְרוֹן, בִּפְאַת מִטָּה וּבִדְמֶשֶׁק עָרֶשׂ." רַבִּי יוֹחַי בְּרַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה אוֹמֵר: "אִם טָרֹף יִטָּרֵף יְבִאֵהוּ עֵד", יָבִיא עֵדִין שֶׁנִּטְרְפָה בְאֹנֶס, וִיהֵא פָטוּר מִלְּשַׁלֵּם.
(Exodus 22:12) "If it were torn (by a wild beast), let him bring ed." This ("ed") is its hide. These are the words of R. Yoshiyah. Even though there is no proof for this (interpretation), there is support for it in (Amos 3:12) "Just as a shepherd can rescue from the mouth of a lion (just) two legs or the cartilage of an ear, etc." R. Yochanan b. Yoshiyah says: "If it were torn, let him bring ed." — Let him bring witnesses ("edim") that it was torn, and he will be exempt from paying.
רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן אוֹמֵר: "יְבִאֵהוּ עֵד הַטְּרֵפָה",*"יְבִאֵהוּ עֵד הַטְּרֵפָה", דורש 'עַד הַטְּרֵפָה'. יוֹלִיךְ אֶת הַבְּעָלִים אֵצֶל הַטְּרֵפָה, וִיהֵא פָטוּר מִלְּשַׁלֵּם.
R. Yonathan says: "let him bring him ad the torn (beast)": Let him lead the owner to ("ad" = until) the torn beast, and he will be exempt from paying.
אַף עַל פִּי כֵן יְהֵי חַיָּב? וְהַדִּין נוֹתֵן: הוֹאִיל וַאֲבֵדָה חֶסְרוֹן שְׁמִירָה, וּטְרֵפָה חֶסְרוֹן שְׁמִירָה, אִם לָמַדְתָּ עַל אֲבֵדָה שֶׁחַיָּב לְשַׁלֵּם, אַף טְרֵפָה יְהֵי חַיָּב לְשַׁלֵּם!
לֹא! מִמַּשְׁמָע שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר "הַטְּרֵפָה לֹא יְשַׁלֵּם", יֵשׁ טְרֵפָה שֶׁהוּא מְשַׁלֵּם, וְיֵשׁ טְרֵפָה שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם.
"For the torn beast he shall not pay": There is a torn beast for which he pays, and there is a torn beast for which he does not pay.
וְאֵי זוֹ הִיא טְרֵפָה שֶׁחַיָּב לְשַׁלֵּם? כְּגוֹן טְרֵפַת חָתוּל, שׁוּעָל וּנְמִיָּה.*וּנְמִיָּה. ג: ומנדרס. וּמִתּוֹךְ שֶׁאָמְרָה תוֹרָה,*וּמִתּוֹךְ. ג,א: ומילחשך. תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר "אִם טָרֹף יִטָּרֵף", מַה טְּרֵפָה מְיֻחֶדֶת, שֶׁאֶפְשָׁר לוֹ לְהַצִּילָהּ, חַיָּב לְשַׁלֵּם, אַף כָּל דָּבָר שֶׁאֶפְשָׁר לוֹ לְהַצִּילוֹ, יְהֵי חַיָּב לְשַׁלֵּם.
Which is a torn beast for which he does pay? A beast torn by a cat, a fox, or a marten. Likewise, wherever it is possible for him to rescue (the beast, and he does not), he is liable to pay.
וְאֵי זוֹ הִיא טְרֵפָה שֶׁפָּטוּר מִלְּשַׁלֵּם? כְּגוֹן טְרֵפַת הַזְּאֵב וְהָאֲרִי, וְהַדֹּב וְהַנָּמֵר וְהַפַּרְדְּלֵס וְהַנָּחָשׁ. וּמִתּוֹךְ שֶׁאָמְרָה תוֹרָה "וּמֵת":*וּמִתּוֹךְ. ג,א: ומילחשך. מַה מִּיתָה מְיֻחֶדֶת, שֶׁאֵי אֶפְשָׁר לוֹ לְהַצִּילוֹ, פָּטוּר מִלְּשַׁלֵּם, אַף כָּל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵיפְשָׁר לוֹ לְהַצִּילוֹ, פָּטוּר מִלְּשַׁלֵּם: "הַטְּרֵפָה לֹא יְשַׁלֵּם."
And which is a torn beast for which he does not pay? A beast torn by a wolf, a lion, a bear, a tiger, a leopard, or a snake. Since the Torah writes (9) "and it die, just as he is not liable to pay in an instance of (natural) death, so, in all instances where he cannot rescue the beast, he is not liable to pay. Thus, "For the torn beast he shall not pay."
(שמות כב,יג) ["וְכִי יִשְׁאַל אִישׁ מֵעִם רֵעֵהוּ, וְנִשְׁבַּר אוֹ מֵת בְּעָלָיו אֵין עִמּוֹ, שַׁלֵּם יְשַׁלֵּם."] "וְכִי יִשְׁאַל אִישׁ מֵעִם רֵעֵהוּ", נִתֵּק הַכָּתוּב הַשּׁוֹאֵל מִכְּלַל שׁוֹמֵר, וַאֲמָרוֹ עִנְיָן בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ. "מֵעִם רֵעֵהוּ", מַגִּיד שֶׁאֵינוֹ חַיָּב עַד שֶׁיּוֹצִיאֶנּוּ חוּץ לִרְשׁוּתוֹ.
(Exodus 22:13) "And if a man borrow from his neighbor": Scripture "cuts off" a borrower from the class of "watcher," and treats it (as a class) in itself. "from his neighbor": We are hereby taught that he (the borrower) is not liable until he removes it from the lender's domain.
"וְנִשְׁבַּר אוֹ מֵת". אֵין לִי אֶלָּא שְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה, שְׁבוּיָה מְנַיִן? הֲרֵי אַתְּ דָּן: נֶאֱמַר כָּן מִיתָה, וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן מִיתָה; מַה מִּיתָה הָאֲמוּרָה לְהַלָּן, עָשָׂה שְׁבוּרָה וּשְׁבוּיָה כְמֵתָה, אַף מִּיתָה הָאֲמוּרָה כָּן נַעֲשֶׂה שְׁבוּרָה וּשְׁבוּיָה כְמֵתָה.
"and it be broken or die": This tells me only of (a borrower's liability for) breaking or death. Whence do I derive (the same for) seizure? "death" is written here, and it is written elsewhere (9). Just as seizure there is juxtaposed with death, so, here (seizure is understood to be juxtaposed with death.)
וַאֲבֵדָה וּגְנֵבָה מְנַיִן? אָמַרְתָּ, קוֹל וָחֹמֶר הוּא: מָה, אִם בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁלֹּא חַיָּב עַל הַמִּיתָה, חַיָּב עַל הַגְּנֵבָה וְעַל הָאֲבֵדָה, וְכָן שֶׁחַיָּב עַל הַמִּיתָה, דִּין הוּא שֶׁנְּחַיֵּב עַל הַגְּנֵבָה וְעַל הָאֲבֵדָה.
Whence do I derive (the same for) theft and loss? It follows a fortiori, viz.: If a hired watcher, who is not liable for death, is liable for theft and loss, then a borrower, who is liable for death, how much more so should he be liable for theft and loss!
"בְּעָלָיו אֵין עִמּוֹ, שַׁלֵּם יְשַׁלֵּם. (שמות כב, יד) אִם בְּעָלָיו עִמּוֹ, לֹא יְשַׁלֵּם". לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר? מִמַּשְׁמַע שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר:
(13) "if its owner were not with him, pay shall he pay. (14) If its owner were with him, he (the borrower) shall not pay": From the first (13), do I not know the second (14)? (Why, then, need it be written?)
"בְּעָלָיו אֵין עִמּוֹ, שַׁלֵּם יְשַׁלֵּם", לָמַדְנוּ שֶׁאִם אֵין בְּעָלָיו עִמּוֹ, חַיָּב לְשַׁלֵּם. וּמַה תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר "בְּעָלָיו אֵין עִמּוֹ, שַׁלֵּם יְשַׁלֵּם"? מַגִּיד שֶׁכֵּיוָן שֶׁיָּצַאת מֵרְשׁוּת הַנִּשְׁאָל לִרְשׁוּת הַשּׁוֹאֵל, אֲפִלּוּ שָׁעָה אַחַת, בַּבְּעָלִים, פָּטוּר, שֶׁלֹּא בַּבְּעָלִים, חַיָּב.
To teach that if it went from the domain of the lender to that of the borrower even for one moment, then (if the beast were) with the owner, he (the borrower) is not liable; if it were not with the owner, he is liable.
(שמות כב,יד) ["אִם בְּעָלָיו עִמּוֹ, לֹא יְשַׁלֵּם; אִם שָׂכִיר הוּא, בָּא בִּשְׂכָרוֹ."] "אִם שָׂכִיר הוּא, בָּא בִּשְׂכָרוֹ." שׁוֹמֵעַ אֲנִי, יִשָּׁבַע וִיהֵא פָטוּר! הֲרֵי אַתְּ דָּן: הוֹאִיל וְנוֹשֵׂא שָׁכָר מַהְנֶה, וְהַשָּׂכִיר מַהְנֶה, אִם לָמַדְתָּ עַל נוֹשֵׂא שָׁכָר, שֶׁנִּשְׁבָּע עַל הָאֳנָסִין, וּמְשַׁלֵּם אֶת הָאֲבֵדָה וְאֶת הַגְּנֵבָה, אַף שָׂכִיר נִשְׁבָּע עַל הָאֳנָסִין, וּמְשַׁלֵּם אֶת הָאֲבֵדָה וְאֶת הַגְּנֵבָה.
"If it (the beast) were hired, it came by its hire (into the hands of the hirer"): I might think that if he swears (viz. Ibid. 10), he is exempt from all payment, you, therefore, reason: Since a paid watcher gives benefit (to the owner) and a hirer gives benefit, and we have learned about a paid watcher, who swears (to exempt himself from liability) for accident, that he pays for theft and loss — then a hirer, too, pays for theft and loss.
וַהֲרֵי שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם יוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁהוּא מַהְנֶה וּפָטוּר מִלְּשַׁלֵּם! הוּא יוֹכִיחַ עַל שָׂכִיר, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהוּא מַהְנֶה, יְהֵי פָטוּר מִלְּשַׁלֵּם!
But this is refuted by (the ordinance for) an unpaid watcher, who, though he gives benefit (to the owner), nonetheless is exempt from (all) payment.
אָמַרְתָּ הֶפְרֵשׁ, נוֹשֵׂא שָׁכָר נֶהֱנֶה וּמַהְנֶה, וְהַשָּׂכִיר נֶהֱנֶה וּמַהְנֶה, וְאַל תָּבִיא שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם יוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁהוּא מַהְנֶה אֲבָל אֵינוֹ נֶהֱנֶה, אֶלָּא נוֹשֵׂא שָׁכָר נֶהֱנֶה וּמַהְנֶה, וְהַשָּׂכִיר נֶהֱנֶה וּמַהְנֶה. אִם לָמַדְתָּ עַל נוֹשֵׂא שָׁכָר, שֶׁנִּשְׁבָּע עַל הָאֳנָסִין, וּמְשַׁלֵּם אֶת הָאֲבֵדָה וְאֶת הַגְּנֵבָה, אַף הַשָּׂכִיר נִשְׁבָּע עַל הָאֳנָסִין, וּמְשַׁלֵּם אֶת הָאֲבֵדָה וְאֶת הַגְּנֵבָה. "אִם שָׂכִיר הוּא, בָּא בִּשְׂכָרוֹ".
Would you say that? There is a crucial difference (between a paid and an unpaid watcher), viz.: Since a paid watcher both derives benefit and gives benefit, and a hirer derives benefit and gives benefit, then the second is to be compared to the first, who swears (for exemption from liability) for accident and pays for theft and loss, and this is not to be refuted by an unpaid watcher, who gives benefit but does not derive it. This is the intent of "If it were hired, it came by its hire" (i.e., it is to be compared to a hired watcher and not to an unhired one.)