(Exodus 21:15) "And if one strikes his father and his mother, he shall be put to death": What is the intent of this? Because it is written (Leviticus 24:20) "an eye for an eye, etc.", and Scripture took it (striking father or mother) out of its category to make it more stringent, to make it liable to the death penalty, this section was, therefore, stated.
"And if one strikes his father and his mother": This tells me only of (one who strikes both) his father and his mother. Whence do I derive (liability for one who strikes) his father and not his mother, or (one who strikes) his mother and not his father? It follows, viz.: Just as with cursing — each one, individually (viz. Leviticus 20:9), so, with striking, each one, individually. No, this may be true of cursing, for which he is liable both for (cursing) the dead as well as the living, wherefore he is liable for each individually, as opposed to striking for which he is not liable for striking the dead as well as the living, wherefore he should not be liable for striking each individually. It is, therefore, written (Leviticus 24:21) "And one who strikes a man shall be put to death." Let it not, then, be written "And if one strikes his father and his mother he shall be put to death." (The meaning must be, then,) even if he strikes only one of them. These are the words of R. Yoshiyah.
R. Yitzchak says: "his mother" must be added for purposes of stringency (i.e., he is liable even for striking his mother). But (if you understand it as "and his mother") you will be implying leniency instead of stringency (i.e., that he is not liable until he strikes both his father and his mother). Perforce, then, it must be understood as "or" his mother.
"And if one strikes his father or his mother": a blow which causes a wound. You say a blow which causes a wound, but perhaps even a blow which does not cause a wound? Would you say this? If (payment) for injuries — the greater — (obtaining both wittingly and unwittingly) there is no liability without a wound, then for punishment — the lesser — (obtaining only wittingly), how much more so should there be no liability without a wound. What, then, is the intent of "If one strikes his father or his mother? A blow which causes a wound.
"he shall be put to death": by strangulation. You say by strangulation, but perhaps by one of the (other) deaths mentioned in the Torah? Would you say that? This is a principle in the Torah: Any (unqualified) "death" mentioned in the Torah — you are not permitted to incline it to severity, but to lenity. These are the words of R. Yehoshiyah. R. Yonathan says: Not because it is of lesser severity, but because all "death" unqualified is strangulation.
From here they ruled: The mitzvah of strangulation — They would stand him in foliage until his hips and they placed hard scarves in soft ones and twisted it around his neck. One pulled from one side, and the other, from the other, until his soul expired. This is "strangulation."
We have heard the punishment, but not the exhortation. It is, therefore, written (of one who administers stripes, Devarim 25:3) "Forty shall he smite him, not more."
It follows a fortiori, viz.: If one who is commanded (by beth-din) to smite is exhorted not to smite (more), then one who is commanded not to smite (his father or mother) how much more so is he exhorted not to smite (ab initio).
(Exodus 21:16) "And one who steals a man and sells him": What is the intent of this? From (Devarim 24:7) "If a man be found (by witnesses) to have stolen a soul of his brothers, etc." I know only of (the necessity for) witnesses to the stealing. Whence do I derive (the same for) witnesses to the selling? From "And one who steals a man and sells him."
"And one who steals a man": This tells me only of one who steals a man. Whence do I derive (the same for) one who steals a woman or a minor? From "If a man be found to have stolen a soul of his brothers" — to include his stealing a woman or a minor.
This ("If a man be found") tells me only of a man who stole. Whence do I derive (the same for) a woman who stole? From "And one who steals a man." This tells me only of a man or a woman who stole a man, and a man who stole a woman or a minor. Whence do I derive (the same for) a woman who stole her neighbor (woman) or a minor? From (Devarim, Ibid.) "Then that thief (man or woman) shall die."
"And one who steals a man": This would exclude (from liability) his stealing a minor. Whence is it derived that he is liable for stealing a minor? From "If a man be found to have stolen a soul, etc." — to include a minor. This ("a soul") would imply that both a minor and an eight-month birth are included. It is, therefore, written "And one who steals a man." He is not liable unless he steals someone who is destined to live (to man's estate, [as opposed to an eight-month birth]). (Then) "one who steals a man" would also include a minor, (who is destined to live to man's estate)! It is, therefore, written "If a man be found to have stolen a soul of his brothers" (connoting "his peers") — to exclude a minor.
(Then) "If a man be found to have stolen a soul" would also connote an eight-month birth. It is, therefore, written "And one who steals a man and sells him," which implies that he is not liable until he steals one who is destined to reach man's estate.
"and sells him": and not half of him. "and he is found": "finding" is only with witnesses. "in his hand": "in his hand" always connotes "his domain." And though there is no proof for this, it is intimated in (Numbers 21:26) "And he took all his land from his hand", and (Genesis 24:10) "And the servant took ten camels … and all the good of his master in his hand," — whence we infer that "in his hand" always connotes "his domain."
"he shall be put to death": by strangulation. You say by strangulation, but perhaps by one of the (other) deaths mentioned in the Torah? Would you say that? This is a principle in the Torah: Any unqualified death mentioned in the Torah — You are not permitted to incline it to severity, but to lenity. These are the words of R. Yoshiyah. R. Yonathan says: Not because it is of lesser severity, but because all "death" unqualified is strangulation.
— an exhortation against stealing a soul (i.e., kidnapping). You say it is an exhortation against stealing a soul, but perhaps it is an exhortation against stealing money? (Leviticus 19:4) "You shall not steal and you shall not deal falsely, etc." is already an exhortation against stealing money. What, then, is the intent of "Thou shalt not steal"? It is an exhortation against stealing souls.
But perhaps the first is an exhortation against stealing money, and the second an exhortation against stealing souls? Would you say that? Three mitzvoth are mentioned in this section (Exodus — "Thou shalt not kill. Thou shalt not commit adultery. Thou shalt not steal." (the first) two are explicit, and the third unqualified. We learn the unqualified from the explicit. Just as the explicit are mitzvoth which are liable to judicial death penalty, so, the unqualified. You must perforce adopt not the second assumption, but the first — This (Exodus) is an exhortation against stealing souls, and the other (Leviticus) is an exhortation against stealing money.
(Exodus 21:7) "And if one curses his father and his mother, etc.": What is the intent of this? From (Leviticus 20:9) "Every man who curses his father or his mother shall be put to death," I would know only of a man. Whence do I derive (the same for) a woman? From "if one curses his father or his mother."
"And if one curses his father and his mother": This ("and") tells me (that he is liable) for cursing only his father and his mother (together). Whence do I derive the same for (cursing) his father and not his mother, or his mother and not his father? From (Leviticus, Ibid.) "His father or his mother he has cursed" — in any event (i.e., either one.) These are the words of R. Yoshiyah.
And what is the intent of "And if one curses his father and his mother"? From (Leviticus, Ibid.) "Every man" I would think that only a man (who cursed) is liable. Whence do I derive (the same for) a woman, a tumtum (one of doubtful sex), and a hermaphrodite? From "if one curses his father and his mother."
This tells me (that he is liable if he curses them) only when they are alive. Whence do I derive (the same for cursing) the dead? From "And if one curses his father and his mother" — in any event, (alive or dead).
"And if one curses his father and his mother": with the explicit Name (i.e., the Tetragrammaton). But perhaps an epithet is intended? Let it not be written redundantly, (Leviticus 24:16) "When he blasphemes the Name he shall be put to death." (It is written thus) to include one who curses his father and mother. He is not liable until he curses them with the explicit Name. These are the words of R. Achai.
R. Chanina b. Iddi says: Since Scripture states "Swear" and "Do not swear," "Curse" and "Do not curse," since swearing is by the Name, so, not swearing is by the Name (i.e., "Do not swear by the Name of"); just as cursing is by the Name, so not cursing is by the Name. "he shall be put to death": by stoning. You say by stoning; but perhaps by one of the other "deaths" of the Torah? It follows thus: It is written here (in respect to cursing father and mother, Leviticus 2:9) "his blood is in him," and elsewhere (Ibid. 27) "their blood is in them." Just as there, (he is killed) by stoning, so, here, by stoning. We have heard the punishment, but whence do we derive the exhortation? From (Exodus 22:27) "Elohim you shall not curse."
If your father is a judge, he is included in "Elohim you shall not curse." And if he is a Nassi ("president"), he is included in (Ibid.) "and a Nassi in your people you shall not curse." If he is neither, it follows by induction from both, viz.: A judge is not like a Nassi, and a Nassi is not like a judge. The common element between them is that they are "in your people," and you are exhorted against cursing them. Your father, too, is "in your people," and you are exhorted against cursing him.
But perhaps the common element between them is that they are dignitaries, and it is their eminence that accounts for this, wherefore you are exhorted against cursing them — as opposed to (the status of) your father! It is, therefore, written (Leviticus 19:14) "You shall not curse a deaf-mute," the most abject of men, and you reason by induction among the three, viz.: A judge is not like a Nassi, and a Nassi is not like a judge, and neither is like a deaf-mute, and a deaf-mute is not like either. The common element among them is that they are "in your people," and you are exhorted against cursing them. Your father, too, is "in your people," and you are exhorted against cursing him.
(שמות כא,טו) "וּמַכֵּה אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ מוֹת יוּמָת." לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר? לְפִי שֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר: (שמות כא,כד) "עַיִן תַּחַת עַיִן, שֵׁן תַּחַת שֵׁן, יָד תַּחַת יָד, רֶגֶל תַּחַת רָגֶל." וַהֲרֵי הַכָּתוּב מוֹצִיאוֹ מִכְּלָלוֹ לְהַחְמִיר עָלָיו, שֶׁיְּהֵי בְמִיתָה. לְכָךְ נֶאֶמְרָה פָּרָשָׁה זוֹ.
(Exodus 21:15) "And if one strikes his father and his mother, he shall be put to death": What is the intent of this? Because it is written (Leviticus 24:20) "an eye for an eye, etc.", and Scripture took it (striking father or mother) out of its category to make it more stringent, to make it liable to the death penalty, this section was, therefore, stated.
"וּמַכֵּה אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ", אֵין לִי אֶלָּא אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ, אָבִיו שֶׁלֹּא אִמּוֹ וְאִמּוֹ שֶׁלֹּא אָבִיו, מְנַיִן? הֲרֵי אַתְּ דָּן: הוֹאִיל וְהַמַּכֶּה חַיָּב, וְהַמְּקַלֵּל חַיָּב, מַה הַמְּקַלֵּל, אֶחָד אֶחָד בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ, אַף הַמַּכֶּה, אֶחָד אֶחָד בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ! לֹא, אִם אָמַרְתָּ בַּמְּקַלֵּל, שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב עַל הַמֵּתִין כַּחַיִּין, לְפִיכָךְ הוּא חַיָּב עַל כָּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ, תֹּאמַר בַּמַּכֶּה, שֶׁאֵינוֹ חַיָּב עַל הַמֵּתִין כַּחַיִּין, לְפִיכָךְ לֹא יְהֵי חַיָּב עַל כָּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ, שֶׁאֵין תַּלְמוּד (לוֹמַר) "וּמַכֵּה אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ", אֶלָּא אֲפִלּוּ אֶחָד מֵהֶן. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה.
"And if one strikes his father and his mother": This tells me only of (one who strikes both) his father and his mother. Whence do I derive (liability for one who strikes) his father and not his mother, or (one who strikes) his mother and not his father? It follows, viz.: Just as with cursing — each one, individually (viz. Leviticus 20:9), so, with striking, each one, individually. No, this may be true of cursing, for which he is liable both for (cursing) the dead as well as the living, wherefore he is liable for each individually, as opposed to striking for which he is not liable for striking the dead as well as the living, wherefore he should not be liable for striking each individually. It is, therefore, written (Leviticus 24:21) "And one who strikes a man shall be put to death." Let it not, then, be written "And if one strikes his father and his mother he shall be put to death." (The meaning must be, then,) even if he strikes only one of them. These are the words of R. Yoshiyah.
רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן אוֹמֵר: מַשְׁמָע שְׁנֵיהֶם כְּאַחַת, וּמַשְׁמָע אֶחָד אֶחָד בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ, עַד שֶׁיִּפְרֹט לָךְ הַכָּתוּב אֶחָד.
R. Yonathan says: ("and") implies both together and each by itself unless Scripture specifies otherwise.
רַבִּי יִצְחָק אוֹמֵר: וְכִי לֹא בָאת אִמּוֹ לְהַחְמִיר עָלָיו וְלֹא לְהָקֵל עָלָיו, לְהַחְמִיר עָלָיו לֹא מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהָחְמַר בּוֹ הוּקַל בּוֹ? וּמַה תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר "וּמַכֵּה אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ"? מִכָּל מָקוֹם.
R. Yitzchak says: "his mother" must be added for purposes of stringency (i.e., he is liable even for striking his mother). But (if you understand it as "and his mother") you will be implying leniency instead of stringency (i.e., that he is not liable until he strikes both his father and his mother). Perforce, then, it must be understood as "or" his mother.
"וּמַכֵּה אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ", מַכָּה שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהּ חַבּוּרָה. אַתָּה אוֹמֵר מַכָּה שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהּ חַבּוּרָה, אוֹ מַכָּה שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ חַבּוּרָה? אָמַרְתָּ, מָה, אִם מִדַּת נִזָּקִין מְרֻבָּה, אֵינוֹ חַיָּב עַד שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה בָהֶן חַבּוּרָה, מִדַּת עֳנָשִׁין מְעוּטָה, וְלֹא יְהֵי בָהּ חַיָּב עַד שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה בָּהֶן חַבּוּרָה. וּמַה תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר "וּמַכֵּה אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ"? מַכָּה שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהּ חַבּוּרָה.
"And if one strikes his father or his mother": a blow which causes a wound. You say a blow which causes a wound, but perhaps even a blow which does not cause a wound? Would you say this? If (payment) for injuries — the greater — (obtaining both wittingly and unwittingly) there is no liability without a wound, then for punishment — the lesser — (obtaining only wittingly), how much more so should there be no liability without a wound. What, then, is the intent of "If one strikes his father or his mother? A blow which causes a wound.
"מוֹת יוּמָת", בֶּחָנֵק. אַתָּה אוֹמֵר בֶּחָנֵק, אוֹ בְאַחַת מִכָּל מִיתוֹת הָאֲמוּרוֹת בַּתּוֹרָה? אָמַרְתָּ, זוֹ מִדָּה בַּתּוֹרָה: כָּל מִיתָה סְתוּמָה בַתּוֹרָה, אֵין אַתְּ רַשַּׁי לְמָשְׁכָהּ לְהַחְמִיר עָלֶיהָ, אֶלָּא לְהָקֵל עָלֶיהָ. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה. רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן אוֹמֵר: לֹא מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהִיא קַלָּה, אֶלָּא שֶׁנֶּאֶמְרָה סְתָם. כָּל מִיתָה שֶׁנֶּאֶמְרָה סְתָם, וַהֲרֵי זוֹ בֶחָנֵק.
"he shall be put to death": by strangulation. You say by strangulation, but perhaps by one of the (other) deaths mentioned in the Torah? Would you say that? This is a principle in the Torah: Any (unqualified) "death" mentioned in the Torah — you are not permitted to incline it to severity, but to lenity. These are the words of R. Yehoshiyah. R. Yonathan says: Not because it is of lesser severity, but because all "death" unqualified is strangulation.
רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: כַּמִּיתָה שֶׁנֶּאֶמְרָה בִידֵי שָׁמַיִם: מַה מִּיתָה שֶׁנֶּאֶמְרָה בִידֵי שָׁמַיִם, מִיתָה שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ רֹשֶׁם, אַף מִיתָה שֶׁנֶּאֶמְרָה כָּן, מִיתָה שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ רֹשֶׁם.
Rebbi says: There is "death" at the hands of Heaven and "death" at the hands of man. Just as the first leaves no outward sign, so, the second.
מִכָּן אָמָרוּ: (דומה למשנה סנהדרין ז,ג) "הֶחָנֵק, מְשַׁקְּעִין אוֹתוֹ בַזֶּבֶל וְעַד אַרְכֻּבּוֹתָיו,*אַרְכֻּבּוֹתָיו: ברכיו. וְנוֹתְנִין סוּדָרִין קָשִׁין בְּתוֹךְ הָרַכִּין,*סוּדָר. sudarium: מטפחת לזיעה. בד שקושרים סביב הצוואר או על הראש. וְכוֹרֵךְ עַל צַוָּארוֹ. זֶה מוֹשֵׁךְ לְהַלָּן וְזֶה מוֹשֵׁךְ לְהַלָּן, עַד שֶׁנַּפְשׁוֹ יוֹצְאָה. זֶה סֵדֶר הֶחָנֵק."
From here they ruled: The mitzvah of strangulation — They would stand him in foliage until his hips and they placed hard scarves in soft ones and twisted it around his neck. One pulled from one side, and the other, from the other, until his soul expired. This is "strangulation."
הָא עֹנֶשׁ שָׁמַעְנוּ, אַזְהָרָה לֹא שָׁמַעְנוּ! תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר: (דברים כה,ג) "אַרְבָּעִים יַכֶּנּוּ, לֹא יֹסִיף".
We have heard the punishment, but not the exhortation. It is, therefore, written (of one who administers stripes, Devarim 25:3) "Forty shall he smite him, not more."
וַהֲרֵי דְּבָרִים קוֹל וָחֹמֶר: מָה, אִם מִי שֶׁמְּצֻוֶּה לְהַכּוֹת, הֲרֵי הוּא מֻזְהָר שֶׁלֹּא לְהַכּוֹת, מִי שֶׁהוּא מְצֻוֶּה שֶׁלֹּא לְהַכּוֹת, דִּין הוּא שֶׁיְּהֵי מֻזְהָר שֶׁלֹּא לְהַכּוֹת.
It follows a fortiori, viz.: If one who is commanded (by beth-din) to smite is exhorted not to smite (more), then one who is commanded not to smite (his father or mother) how much more so is he exhorted not to smite (ab initio).
(שמות כא,טז) ["וְגֹנֵב אִישׁ וּמְכָרוֹ וְנִמְצָא בְיָדוֹ מוֹת יוּמָת."] "וְגֹנֵב אִישׁ וּמְכָרוֹ", לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר? לְפִי שֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר: (דברים כד,ז) "כִּי יִמָּצֵא אִישׁ גֹּנֵב נֶפֶשׁ מֵאֶחָיו מִבְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, וְהִתְעַמֶּר בּוֹ וּמְכָרוֹ, וּמֵת הַגַּנָּב הַהוּא, וּבִעַרְתָּ הָרָע מִקִּרְבֶּךָ." אֵין לִי אֶלָּא עֵדִין עַל גְּנֵבָה, עֵדִין עַל מְכִירָה, מְנַיִן? תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר "וְגֹנֵב אִישׁ וּמְכָרוֹ".
(Exodus 21:16) "And one who steals a man and sells him": What is the intent of this? From (Devarim 24:7) "If a man be found (by witnesses) to have stolen a soul of his brothers, etc." I know only of (the necessity for) witnesses to the stealing. Whence do I derive (the same for) witnesses to the selling? From "And one who steals a man and sells him."
"וְגֹנֵב אִישׁ", אֵין לִי אֶלָּא אִישׁ שֶׁגָּנַב אֶת הָאִישׁ, גָּנַב אֶת הָאִשָּׁה מְנַיִן? אֶת הַקָּטָן, מְנַיִן? תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר: (דברים כד,ז) "כִּי יִמָּצֵא אִישׁ גֹּנֵב נֶפֶשׁ מֵאֶחָיו", לְהָבִיא אֶת שֶׁגָּנַב אֶת הָאִשָּׁה וְאֶת הַקָּטָן.
"And one who steals a man": This tells me only of one who steals a man. Whence do I derive (the same for) one who steals a woman or a minor? From "If a man be found to have stolen a soul of his brothers" — to include his stealing a woman or a minor.
אֵין לִי אֶלָּא אִישׁ וְאִשָּׁה שֶׁגָּנְבוּ אֶת הָאִישׁ, וְהָאִישׁ שֶׁגָּנַב אֶת הָאִשָּׁה וְאֶת הַקָּטָן, הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁגָּנְבָה אֶת חֲבֶרְתָּהּ וְאֶת הַקָּטָן, מְנַיִן? תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר: (דברים כד,ז) "וּמֵת הַגַּנָּב הַהוּא", מִכָּל מָקוֹם.
This ("If a man be found") tells me only of a man who stole. Whence do I derive (the same for) a woman who stole? From "And one who steals a man." This tells me only of a man or a woman who stole a man, and a man who stole a woman or a minor. Whence do I derive (the same for) a woman who stole her neighbor (woman) or a minor? From (Devarim, Ibid.) "Then that thief (man or woman) shall die."
"וְגֹנֵב אִישׁ", אַף הַקָּטָן בְּמַשְׁמָע! תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר: (דברים כד,ז) "כִּי יִמָּצֵא אִישׁ גֹּנֵב נֶפֶשׁ מֵאֶחָיו", לְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַקָּטָן.
"And one who steals a man": This would exclude (from liability) his stealing a minor. Whence is it derived that he is liable for stealing a minor? From "If a man be found to have stolen a soul, etc." — to include a minor. This ("a soul") would imply that both a minor and an eight-month birth are included. It is, therefore, written "And one who steals a man." He is not liable unless he steals someone who is destined to live (to man's estate, [as opposed to an eight-month birth]). (Then) "one who steals a man" would also include a minor, (who is destined to live to man's estate)! It is, therefore, written "If a man be found to have stolen a soul of his brothers" (connoting "his peers") — to exclude a minor.
(דברים כד,ז) "כִּי יִמָּצֵא אִישׁ גֹּנֵב נֶפֶשׁ", שׁוֹמֵעַ אֲנִי, אַף בֶּן שְׁמוֹנָה בְּמַשְׁמָע! תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר "וְגֹנֵב אִישׁ וּמְכָרוֹ", מַגִּיד שֶׁאֵינוֹ חַיָּב עַד שֶׁיִּגְנֹב בֶּן קַיָּמָה.
(Then) "If a man be found to have stolen a soul" would also connote an eight-month birth. It is, therefore, written "And one who steals a man and sells him," which implies that he is not liable until he steals one who is destined to reach man's estate.
"וּמְכָרוֹ", לֹא שֶׁמָּכַר חֶצְיוֹ. "וְנִמְצָא", אֵין מְצִיאָה אֶלָּא בְעֵדִים. "בְיָדוֹ". אֵין "בְּיָדוֹ" בְּכָל מָקוֹם אֶלָּא רְשׁוּתוֹ. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין רְאָיָה לַדָּבָר, זֵכֶר הוּא: (במדבר כא,כו) "וַיִּקַּח אֶת כָּל אַרְצוֹ מִיָּדוֹ עַד אַרְנֹן." (בראשית כד,י) "וַיִּקַּח הָעֶבֶד עֲשָׂרָה גְמַלִּים מִגְּמַלֵּי אֲדֹנָיו, וַיֵּלֶךְ וְכָל טוּב אֲדֹנָיו בְּיָדוֹ", הָא אֵין 'יָדוֹ' בְכָל מָקוֹם אֶלָּא רְשׁוּתוֹ.
"and sells him": and not half of him. "and he is found": "finding" is only with witnesses. "in his hand": "in his hand" always connotes "his domain." And though there is no proof for this, it is intimated in (Numbers 21:26) "And he took all his land from his hand", and (Genesis 24:10) "And the servant took ten camels … and all the good of his master in his hand," — whence we infer that "in his hand" always connotes "his domain."
"מוֹת יוּמָת." בֶּחָנֵק. אַתָּה אוֹמֵר בֶּחָנֵק, אוֹ בְאַחַת מִכָּל מִיתוֹת הָאֲמוּרוֹת בַּתּוֹרָה? אָמַרְתָּ, זוֹ מִדָּה בַתּוֹרָה: כָּל מִיתָה סְתוּמָה בַתּוֹרָה, אֵין אַתְּ רַשַּׁי לְמָשְׁכָהּ לְהַחְמִיר עָלֶיהָ, אֶלָּא לְהָקֵל עָלֶיהָ. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה. רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן אוֹמֵר: לֹא מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהִיא קַלָּה, אֶלָּא שֶׁנֶּאֶמְרָה סְתָם, וְכָל מִיתָה שֶׁנֶּאֶמְרָה סְתָם, הֲרֵי זוֹ בֶחָנֵק.
"he shall be put to death": by strangulation. You say by strangulation, but perhaps by one of the (other) deaths mentioned in the Torah? Would you say that? This is a principle in the Torah: Any unqualified death mentioned in the Torah — You are not permitted to incline it to severity, but to lenity. These are the words of R. Yoshiyah. R. Yonathan says: Not because it is of lesser severity, but because all "death" unqualified is strangulation.
רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: כַּמִּיתָה שֶׁנֶּאֶמְרָה בִּידֵי שָׁמַיִם: מַה מִּיתָה שֶׁנֶּאֶמְרָה בִּידֵי שָׁמַיִם, מִיתָה שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ רֹשֶׁם, אַף מִיתָה שֶׁנֶּאֶמְרָה כָּן, מִיתָה שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ רֹשֶׁם.
Rebbi says: There is "death" at the hands of heaven and "death" at the hands of man. Just as the first leaves no outward sign, so, the second.
מִכָּן אָמָרוּ: (דומה למשנה סנהדרין ז,ג) "הֶחָנֵק, מְשַׁקְּעִין אוֹתוֹ בַזֶּבֶל עַד אַרְכֻּבּוֹתָיו, וְנוֹתֵן סוּדָרִין קָשִׁין בְּתוֹךְ הָרַכִּין, וְכוֹרֵךְ עַל צַוָּארוֹ. זֶה מוֹשֵׁךְ לְהַלָּן וְזֶה מוֹשֵׁךְ לְהַלָּן. זֶה הוּא סֵדֶר חֲנִיקָה."
From here they ruled: The mitzvah of strangulation, etc.
עֹנֶשׁ שָׁמַעְנוּ, אַזְהָרָה לֹא שָׁמַעְנוּ! תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר (שמות כ,יב) "לֹא תִגְנֹב".
(See above) We have heard the punishment, but not the exhortation. It is, therefore, written (Exodus 20:13) "Thou shalt not steal"
(שמות כ,יב) "לֹא תִגְנֹב". הֲרֵי זוֹ אַזְהָרָה לְגוֹנֵב נֶפֶשׁ. אַתָּה אוֹמֵר הֲרֵי זוֹ אַזְהָרָה לְגוֹנֵב נֶפֶשׁ, אוֹ אַזְהָרָה לְגוֹנֵב מָמוֹן? וּכְשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר: (ויקרא יט,יא) "לֹא תִּגְנֹבוּ וְלֹא תְכַחֲשׁוּ, וְלֹא תְשַׁקְּרוּ אִישׁ בַּעֲמִיתוֹ", הֲרֵי זוֹ אַזְהָרָה לְגוֹנֵב מָמוֹן אָמוּר. הָא מַה תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר "לֹא תִגְנֹב"? הֲרֵי זוֹ אַזְהָרָה לְגוֹנֵב נֶפֶשׁ.
— an exhortation against stealing a soul (i.e., kidnapping). You say it is an exhortation against stealing a soul, but perhaps it is an exhortation against stealing money? (Leviticus 19:4) "You shall not steal and you shall not deal falsely, etc." is already an exhortation against stealing money. What, then, is the intent of "Thou shalt not steal"? It is an exhortation against stealing souls.
אוֹ הֲרֵי זוֹ אַזְהָרָה לְגוֹנֵב מָמוֹן, וְהַלָּה אַזְהָרָה לְגוֹנֵב נֶפֶשׁ? אָמַרְתָּ, שָׁלֹשׁ מִצְווֹת נֶאֶמְרוּ בָעִנְיָן, שְׁתַּיִם מְפֹרָשׁוֹת וְאַחַת סְתוּמָה. נִלְמֹד הַסְּתוּמָה מִן הַמְּפֹרָשׁוֹת: מַה מְּפֹרָשׁוֹת, מִצְווֹת שֶׁחַיָּבִין עֲלֵיהֶן מִיתַת בֵּית דִּין, אַף הַסְּתוּמָה, מִצְוָה שֶׁחַיָּבִין עָלֶיהָ מִיתַת בֵּית דִּין. הָא אֵין עָלֶיךָ לוֹמַר כְּלָשׁוֹן אַחֲרוֹן, אֶלָּא כְּלָשׁוֹן רִאשׁוֹן: הֲרֵי זוֹ אַזְהָרָה לְגוֹנֵב נֶפֶשׁ, וְהַלָּה אַזְהָרָה לְגוֹנֵב מָמוֹן.
But perhaps the first is an exhortation against stealing money, and the second an exhortation against stealing souls? Would you say that? Three mitzvoth are mentioned in this section (Exodus — "Thou shalt not kill. Thou shalt not commit adultery. Thou shalt not steal." (the first) two are explicit, and the third unqualified. We learn the unqualified from the explicit. Just as the explicit are mitzvoth which are liable to judicial death penalty, so, the unqualified. You must perforce adopt not the second assumption, but the first — This (Exodus) is an exhortation against stealing souls, and the other (Leviticus) is an exhortation against stealing money.
(שמות כא,יז) "וּמְקַלֵּל אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ מוֹת יוּמָת." לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר? לְפִי שֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר: (ויקרא כ,ט) "כִּי אִישׁ אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יְקַלֵּל אֶת אָבִיו וְאֶת אִמּוֹ, מוֹת יוּמָת, אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ קִלֵּל, דָּמָיו בּוֹ." אֵין לִי אֶלָּא אִישׁ, אִשָּׁה מְנַיִן? תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר "וּמְקַלֵּל אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ".
(Exodus 21:7) "And if one curses his father and his mother, etc.": What is the intent of this? From (Leviticus 20:9) "Every man who curses his father or his mother shall be put to death," I would know only of a man. Whence do I derive (the same for) a woman? From "if one curses his father or his mother."
"וּמְקַלֵּל אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ". אֵין לִי אֶלָּא אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ; אָבִיו שֶׁלֹּא אִמּוֹ, וְאִמּוֹ שֶׁלֹּא אָבִיו, מְנַיִן? תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר: (ויקרא כ,ט) "אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ קִלֵּל", מִכָּל מָקוֹם. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה.
"And if one curses his father and his mother": This ("and") tells me (that he is liable) for cursing only his father and his mother (together). Whence do I derive the same for (cursing) his father and not his mother, or his mother and not his father? From (Leviticus, Ibid.) "His father or his mother he has cursed" — in any event (i.e., either one.) These are the words of R. Yoshiyah.
רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן אוֹמֵר: מַשְׁמָע שְׁנֵיהֶן כְּאַחַת, וּמַשְׁמָע אֶחָד אֶחָד בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ, עַד שֶׁיִּפְרֹט לָךְ הַכָּתוּב אֶחָד.
R. Yonathan says: ("his father and his mother") implies both together or either one, unless Scripture specifies one.
רַבִּי יִצְחָק אוֹמֵר: וְכִי לָמָּה בָאת אִמּוֹ? לְהַחְמִיר עָלָיו אוֹ לְהָקֵל עָלָיו? לְהַחְמִיר עָלָיו. לֹא מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהָחְמַר בּוֹ הוּקַל בּוֹ. הָא מְנַיִן? תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר: (שמות כא,טו) "וּמַכֵּה אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ", מִכָּל מָקוֹם.
וּמַה תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר "וּמְקַלֵּל אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ מוֹת יוּמָת"? אֵין לִי אֶלָּא אִישׁ; אִשָּׁה, טוּמְטוּם וְאַנְדְּרוֹגִינוֹס מְנַיִן? תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר "וּמְקַלֵּל אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ".
And what is the intent of "And if one curses his father and his mother"? From (Leviticus, Ibid.) "Every man" I would think that only a man (who cursed) is liable. Whence do I derive (the same for) a woman, a tumtum (one of doubtful sex), and a hermaphrodite? From "if one curses his father and his mother."
אֵין לִי אֶלָּא בַּחַיִּין; בַּמֵּתִין מְנַיִן? תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר: (ויקרא כ,ט) "אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ קִלֵּל", מִכָּל מָקוֹם.
This tells me (that he is liable if he curses them) only when they are alive. Whence do I derive (the same for cursing) the dead? From "And if one curses his father and his mother" — in any event, (alive or dead).
"וּמְקַלֵּל אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ", בַּשֵׁם הַמְפֹרָשׁ. אַתָּה אוֹמֵר בַּשֵׁם הַמְפֹרָשׁ, אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא בְכִנּוּיָו? שֶׁאֵין תַּלְמוּד (לוֹמַר) (ויקרא כד,טז) "בְּנָקְבוֹ שֵׁם יוּמָת", אֶלָּא לְהָבִיא אֶת הַמְּקַלֵּל אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ, שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵי חַיָּב עַד שֶׁיְּקַלְּלֵם בַּשֵׁם הַמְפֹרָשׁ. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יַחַי בְּרַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּהוּ.
"And if one curses his father and his mother": with the explicit Name (i.e., the Tetragrammaton). But perhaps an epithet is intended? Let it not be written redundantly, (Leviticus 24:16) "When he blasphemes the Name he shall be put to death." (It is written thus) to include one who curses his father and mother. He is not liable until he curses them with the explicit Name. These are the words of R. Achai.
רַבִּי חֲנַנְיָה בֶּן אִדִּי אוֹמֵר: הוֹאִיל וְאָמְרָה תוֹרָה: 'הִשָּׁבַע!' 'אַל תִּשָּׁבַע!' 'קַלֵּל!' וְ'אַל תְּקַלֵּל!' מַה 'הִשָּׁבַע', בַּשֵּׁם, אַף 'אַל תִּשָּׁבַע' בַּשֵּׁם; מַה 'קַּלֵּל', בַּשֵּׁם, אַף 'אַל תְּקַלֵּל' בַּשֵּׁם. "מוֹת יוּמָת". בִּסְקִילָה. אַתָּה אוֹמֵר בִּסְקִילָה, אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא בֶּחָנֵק? הֲרֵי אַתְּ דָן: נֶאֱמַר כָּן (ויקרא כ,ט) "דָּמָיו בּוֹ", וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן (ויקרא כ,כז) "מוֹת יוּמְתוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם, דְּמֵיהֶם בָּם." מַה לְּהַלָּן בִּסְקִילָה, אַף כָּן בִּסְקִילָה. עֹנֶשׁ שָׁמַעְנוּ, וְאַזְהָרָה לֹא שָׁמַעְנוּ! תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר: (שמות כב,כז) "אֱלֹהִים לֹא תְקַלֵּל".
R. Chanina b. Iddi says: Since Scripture states "Swear" and "Do not swear," "Curse" and "Do not curse," since swearing is by the Name, so, not swearing is by the Name (i.e., "Do not swear by the Name of"); just as cursing is by the Name, so not cursing is by the Name. "he shall be put to death": by stoning. You say by stoning; but perhaps by one of the other "deaths" of the Torah? It follows thus: It is written here (in respect to cursing father and mother, Leviticus 2:9) "his blood is in him," and elsewhere (Ibid. 27) "their blood is in them." Just as there, (he is killed) by stoning, so, here, by stoning. We have heard the punishment, but whence do we derive the exhortation? From (Exodus 22:27) "Elohim you shall not curse."
אִם דַּיָּן הוּא אָבִיךָ, הֲרֵי הוּא בִכְלַל (שמות כב,כז) "אֱלֹהִים לֹא תְקַלֵּל", וְאִם נָשִׂיא הוּא אָבִיךָ, הוּא בִכְלַל (שמות כב,כז) "וְנָשִׂיא בְעַמְּךָ לֹא תָאֹר." אֵינוֹ לֹא דַּיָּן וְלֹא נָשִׂיא אֶלָּא בּוּר, הֲרֵי אַתְּ דָּן בִּנְיַן אָב מִבֵּין שְׁנֵיהֶן: לֹא הֲרֵי דַּיָּן כַּהֲרֵי נָשִׂיא, וְלֹא הֲרֵי נָשִׂיא כַּהֲרֵי דַּיָּן. הַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן, שֶׁבְּעַמְּךָ וְאַתְּ מֻזְהָר עַל קִלְלָתָן; אַף אָבִיךָ שֶׁבְּעַמְּךָ, תְּהֵי מֻזְהָר עַל קִלְלָתוֹ.
If your father is a judge, he is included in "Elohim you shall not curse." And if he is a Nassi ("president"), he is included in (Ibid.) "and a Nassi in your people you shall not curse." If he is neither, it follows by induction from both, viz.: A judge is not like a Nassi, and a Nassi is not like a judge. The common element between them is that they are "in your people," and you are exhorted against cursing them. Your father, too, is "in your people," and you are exhorted against cursing him.
אוֹ מַה הַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן? שֶׁהֵן גְּדוֹלִים, וּבְעַמְּךָ, וּגְדֻלָּתָן גָּרְמָה לָהֶן, אַתְּ מֻזְהָר עַל קִלְלָתָן. וְאָבִיךָ שֶׁהוּא גָדוֹל וּבְעַמְּךָ וּגְדֻלָּתוֹ גָּרְמָה לוֹ, לֹא תְהֵי מֻזְהָר עַל קִלְלָתוֹ! תִּלְמֹד לוֹמַר (ויקרא יט,יד) "לֹא תְקַלֵּל חֵרֵשׁ". דִּבֵּר הַכָּתוּב בָּאֻמְלָלִים שֶׁבָּאָדָם. הֲרֵי אַתְּ דָּן בִּנְיַן אָב מִבֵּין שְׁלָשְׁתָּן: לֹא הֲרֵי דַּיָּן כַּהֲרֵי נָשִׂיא, לֹא הֲרֵי נָשִׂיא כַּהֲרֵי דַּיָּן, לֹא זֶה וָזֶה כַּהֲרֵי חֵרֵשׁ, לֹא הֲרֵי חֵרֵשׁ כַּהֲרֵי זֶה וָזֶה. הֲרֵי הַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן, שֶׁבְּעַמְּךָ, וְאַתְּ מֻזְהָר עַל קִלְלָתָן. אַף אָבִיךָ שֶׁבְּעַמְּךָ, תְּהֵי מֻזְהָר עַל קִלְלָתוֹ.
But perhaps the common element between them is that they are dignitaries, and it is their eminence that accounts for this, wherefore you are exhorted against cursing them — as opposed to (the status of) your father! It is, therefore, written (Leviticus 19:14) "You shall not curse a deaf-mute," the most abject of men, and you reason by induction among the three, viz.: A judge is not like a Nassi, and a Nassi is not like a judge, and neither is like a deaf-mute, and a deaf-mute is not like either. The common element among them is that they are "in your people," and you are exhorted against cursing them. Your father, too, is "in your people," and you are exhorted against cursing him.