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שמעתתא ד 1

Shev Shmateta · Shmatta 4, Chapter 1

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  1. 1

    נקטינן רוב וקרוב הולכין אחר הרוב בפ"ב דב"ב (דף כ"ג ע"ב), אמר ר' חנינא רוב וקרוב הולכין אחר הרוב, ואע"ג דרובא דאורייתא וקורבא דאורייתא אפ"ה רובא עדיף, אמר אביי אף אנן נמי תנינא דם שנמצא בפרוזדור ספיקו טמא שחזקתו מן המקור ואע"ג דאיכא עליה דמקרבא ע"ש, פירש"י ספיקו טמא, ספק זה טומאה ודאית מדקתני שחזקתו מן המקור, וזה ספיקא יש כאן ברישא דמתניתין במסכת נדה משלו משל באשה החדר ופרוזדור ועליה דם החדר טמא והוא המקור, ומפרש בגמרא החדר מבפנים בעובי גופה לצד אחוריה והפרוזדור מבחוץ לצד פניה והעליה בנויה על גבי שניהם, ודם העליה טהור ולול פתוח מעליה לפרוזדור, וקתני נמצא בפרוזדור חזקתו מן המקור בא ויצא לחוץ הואיל ורוב דמים מצויים בו, ולא אמרינן מן העליה נטף דרך הלול ואע"ג דעליה קרוב לפרוזדור שעל גבו, א"ל רבא רוב ומצוי קאמרת רוב ומצוי ליכא למאן דאמר, ופירש"י רוב ומצוי דמיו רבים יותר משל עליה ועוד שהן תדירין לצאת, בהא ליכא מאן דפליג על ר' חנינא ע"ש, דתני ר' חייא דם הנמצא בפרוזדור חייבין על ביאת מקדש וקדשיו ושורפין עליו את התרומה ובתוס' שם ז"ל אי גרסינן דתני תימא היכי מייתי ראיה מהכא דרוב ומצוי הוא, דלמא לאו משום דרוב ומצוי קאמר ר' חייא דשורפין עליו את התרומה אלא משום דרוב וקרוב הולכין אחר הרוב כר' חנינא וע"ש.

    We have a tradition [or, it is accepted halacha 1see https://daf-yomi.com/DYItemDetails.aspx?itemId=13710], that in cases where a majority (rov) conflicts with proximity (karov), we follow the majority. In chapter 2 of Bava Batra.23b it states: R. Chanina said, "majority and proximity, we follow the majority," and even though following the majority is a rule of biblical origin, and following proximity is a rule of biblical origin, the majority takes precedence. Abaye said, "We have learned similarly in a mishna (Niddah.17b), blood found in the 'passageway' 2generally translated as cervical canal of the uterus, but on anatomic grounds it may be preferable to translate as vagina or introitus if of doubtful origin, it is considered to be levitically impure, for there is a strong assumption that it comes from the uterus, even though the 'attic' (generally translated as ovary, but some identify this with the urinary bladder) is closer". Investigate there. Rashi on "the doubtful blood is impure" explains, "this doubt is treated as definitely impure, for the text states, 'there is a strong assumption it comes from the uterus'.
    This doubt is discussed in the Mishna in Tractate Nidda (Niddah.17b), "They (the Rabbis) described a woman euphemistically as having a room, passageway, and attic. Blood from the room is impure, and this is the source (i.e. uterus). The Gemara explains that the room is internal, in the thickness of the body posteriorly. The passageway is external towards the 'face' (i.e. surface sexual structures), and the 'attic' is above the two. Blood from the attic is levitically pure, and there is a small portal open from the attic to the passageway 3Anatomically it makes more sense to say that the mishna is referring to the urethra, which opens from the urinary bladder into the introitus. However, if we interpret "attic (aliya)" as the ovary, then it is difficult to understand the meaning of portal, because there is no portal from the ovary into the cervix. The fallopian tubes do open into the upper uterus, but not into the cervix.. We learned (if blood) is found in the passageway, there is a strong assumption that it came from the source (i.e. uterus) and exited, because most blood is found in the the source. We do not say that it came from the attic and flowed into the passageway via the portal, even though the attic is situated atop the passageway and is closer. Rava said to him (Abaye) you referred to (the combination of) majority and prevalent? No one disagrees (that the combination of majority and prevalent is more powerful than proximity alone). Rashi explained, majority and prevalent, in that uterine blood is more plentiful than blood from the attic, and also that it (uterine blood) exits more frequently. In this case, no one argues with R. Chanina, see there. For R. Hiyya taught (Bava Batra.24a), (for) blood found in the passageway, one is liable upon entry into the temple and eating sacrificial foods [4 see https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%98%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%AA_%D7%9E%D7%A7%D7%93%D7%A9_%D7%95%D7%A7%D7%93%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%95 ] and teruma is burned. Tosafot ad loc (lead words d'tani) writes, if the correct text is AS R. Hiyya taught (i.e. as a proof for the preceding statement of Rava), then it is problematic, how did (Rava) adduce proof from here that it is a case of majority with prevalent, perhaps R. Hiyya stated that we burn teruma not because it is a case of majority and prevalent, but because when majority is contradicted by proximity, we follow the majority, as stated by R. Chanina, see there.

  2. 2

    ונראה ליישב דאביי רצה להוכיח דרוב וקרוב הולכין אחר הרוב משום דמחזיקינן בדם המקור אע"ג דעליה מקרבא טפי, אלא ע"כ דרובא עדיף במקור יותר מדם שבעליה, ורבא דחי לה התם משום דהוי רוב ומצוי, והיינו חדא דבמקור יותר דמים מדם שבעליה ועוד מצוי לזוב יותר דם המקור מזיבת דם העליה וכמו שמבואר מפירש"י הנזכר והנה קיי"ל כשמואל דאמר בפרק הרואה כתם (נדה נז.) דאין אשה טמאה מן התורה עד שתרגיש בבשרה, וע"ש דפריך ממתניתין טובא, ומסיק מדרבנן, וכן מבואר בשו"ע יו"ד סי' קפ"ג אשה שיצא דם ממקורה בין באונס בין ברצון טמאה והוא שתרגיש ביציאתו, ומיהו משתרגיש בו שנעקר ממקומו ויצא טמאה אפילו לא יצא לחוץ ע"ש, ומדברי סופרים הוא דטמאה בלא הרגשה, וכל קבוע כמחצה על מחצה, ואם נולד הספק במקום הקביעות כגון שראינו שלקח נכרי לפנינו מאחת החנויות הו"ל נמי קבוע וכמ"ש תוס' פרק גיד הנשה (חולין דף צ"ה), וכן כתב שם הרשב"א (דף צה ד"ה ) והר"ן, וכן בטור סי' ק"י, וכן פסק הרמ"א שם ע"ש, וקבוע כמחצה על מחצה בין להקל בין להחמיר, וא"כ מהא דתני ר' חייא דם שנמצא בפרוזדור חייבין עליו על ביאת מקדש וקדשיו ע"כ טומאה דאורייתא היא, דבטומאה דרבנן ליכא חיוב קרבן בטומאת מקדש, וכיון דסובר ר' חייא דטמאה מן התורה, תו ליכא למימר משום רוב וקרוב ומשום שיותר דמים במקור מבעליה, דכיון דטומאה דאורייתא אי אפשר בלא הרגשה, וכיון שהרגישה ביציאת דמים מבשרה אלא שלא נודע לה אם מן המקור אם מן העליה, הו"ל נולד הספק במקום הקביעות וכל קבוע כמחצה על מחצה, אלא ע"כ משום דמצוי לזוב יותר מן המקור, וא"כ ה"ה במתניתין דקתני שחזקתו מן המקור הטעם משום רוב ומצוי, ולזה שפיר הוכיח מדתני ר' חייא, דממתני' דקתני שחזקתו מן המקור מצינו למימר משום דרוב דמים במקור ובלא הרגשה ומדרבנן וכדמוקי כמה מתניתין בפרק הרואה כתם מדרבנן, אבל בדר' חייא דע"כ מדאורייתא כיון דתני חייבין עליו על ביאת מקדש, וא"כ ע"כ בהרגשה והו"ל נולד הספק במקום הקביעות, וע"כ משום דמצוי לזוב יותר, ובזה לא שייך קבוע והו"ל רוב ומצוי וליכא למאן דאמר.

    It seems reasonable to resolve (Tosafot's question), that Abaye wanted to prove the rule that in cases of majority (rov) vs. proximity (karov) we follow the majority, because we rely on a supposition that blood (in the corridor) derives from the uterus even though the "attic" (ovary, or possibly bladder) is closer because perforce the majority of blood deriving from the uterus is greater than the (amount of) blood deriving from the attack. Rava rebutted there because the case (adduced by Abaye) was actually a case of majority (rov) together with prevalent (matzui). That is to say, there is more blood in the source (uterus) than in the attic (ovary, or bladder, see footnote 3 above), and in addition, blood commonly flows from the source than it does from the attic, as explained by the Rashi quoted above (Bava Batra 24a).
    We establish halacha according to the dictum of Shmuel, who stated in the chapter "A woman who sees a stain" (Niddah.57b, chapter 8), a woman is not Biblically impure until she senses the blood flow in her flesh 5i.e. if she merely sees blood without internal sensation of menstruation, then she is merely Rabbinically impure, and see there that the gemara asks from multiple other mishnayot, and concludes that it (the impurity arising from a stain) is of Rabbinic origin. This is likewise explained in Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah chapter 183 (Shulchan Arukh Yoreh De'ah 183). "A woman who has a discharge of blood from her uterus, whether due to outside factors or purposefully, is impure, on the condition that she felt it escaping." Nevertheless, as soon as she feels (the blood) separating from its place and (starting to) leave, she is impure, even if it did not yet emerge, see there. It is only of scribal (Rabbinic) origin that she is impure without sensation.
    (There is a general rule that) "whenever (a doubt arises in a) fixed location, it is considered (legally) as half vs. half." If the doubt arises in the fixed location (or possibly, in its usual location), for example we saw a non-Jew purchase from one of the stores 6The standard case for the law of "Kol kavua k'mechtza al mechtza dami" is a plaza with 9 butchershops selling kosher meat, and one butchershop selling non-kosher meat. If we see the non-Jew purchasing meat from one of the shops, but do not see which butchershop he entered, the we disregard the majority, interpret the case as being half and half, and the meat is not permissible. However, if we a find a piece of meat in the plaza, then the meat is permitted, because most of the shops sell kosher meat., the (rule of) "fixed location" also applies, as written by Tosafot in chapter "Sciatic nerve" ( lead words "hacha nami" Tosafot on Chullin 95a:7), and Rashba and Ran wrote similarly ad loc, as did the Tur ( Tur, Yoreh Deah 110:1 ), and the Rama (Shulchan Arukh Yoreh De'ah.110) also rules this way. The rule of "a fixed location is as half against half" is applied whether (it results in) a leniency or stringency, and therefore, from that which R. Hiyya taught that for (impurity caused by) blood found in the corridor there is liability (for bringing an "oleh v'yored" sacrifice) upon entering the temple, and since R. Hiyya holds that the impurity is of Biblical origin (otherwise there would be no liability to bring a sacrifice), we are unable to say the ruling is attributable to a preference for majority over proximity, that blood from the source is more plentiful than blood from the attic. Since Torah law impurity is impossible without (internal) sensation, and since she felt blood starting to escape from her flesh, but did not know whether it was coming from the source or the attic, it is (considered ) a case of the the doubt arising in the fixed location, and the rule of "fixed location is as half vs. half" applies 7Thus we cannot legally ascribe the blood to uterine blood, and must apply other criteria (in this case "prevalent" (matzui) in order to declare the woman impure.. Perforce, the reason (that she is impure) is because blood more commonly flows from the source, and likewise in the Mishna (Niddah.17b) which taught that there is a strong presumption that the blood is from the source, the reason is because of the (combination of) majority (rov) and prevalent (matzui). This indeed is proven from the baraita of R. Hiyya (but not from the mishna), for the mishna which taught that there is a strong presumption that the blood is from the source could be interpreted as referring to a Rabbinic impurity without sensation (of internal flow), due to the majority of blood being in the source (uterus), as was established for several Mishnayot in chapter "Haroah" (Mishnah Niddah.8, relevant gemara Niddah.57b) that they refer to Rabbinic impurity. But from (the statement of) R. Hiyya, which perforce refers to Biblical impurity as implied by the liability for entering the temple (in a state of impurity), and therefore (the blood flow was accompanied by) sensation (of internal flow), and the doubt (as to the source of the blood flow) originates in the fixed location, (the reason for impurity) must be established as arising from the fact that blood flows more commonly (from the uterus), and the rule of "fixed location" does not apply (to prevalent / matzui). The reason for impurity is therefor the combination of majority (rov) and prevalent (matzui) and there is no one who disagrees (with the statement that the combination of majority (rov) and prevalent (matzui) is more powerful that proximity (karov).

  3. 3

    ואע"ג דרובא לא מהני ביה כיון דבהרגשה הו"ל קבוע כמחצה על מחצה, מ"מ בהדי מצוי מצרפין נמי את הרוב, וכעין זה בש"ך יו"ד סי' ק"י ע"ש בש"ך ז"ל, ואע"ג דלא מהני ס"ס היכא דספק א' בגוף וספק א' בתערובות כיון דספק הראשון אסור מן התורה, דהכא דין קבוע חידוש הוא, דבכל דוכתי אזלינן בתר רובא וכמ"ש הר"ן, ואין לך בו אלא חידושו, והיינו כשהוא בפני עצמו ולא כשנתערב ע"ש, וה"ה הכא אע"ג דרובא לחודיה לא מהני משום דקבוע כמחצה על מחצה, כיון דחידוש הוא מצטרף בהדי מצוי להכריע נגד הקרוב, ועיקר הוכחת רבא דאינו משום רוב דמים וכסברת אביי אלא משום מצוי, ובהדי מצוי מצטרף נמי רוב דמים אע"ג דהוה ליה קבוע וכמ"ש, ודוק.

    Even though the majority (of blood) is not relevant (by itself) because sensation (of flow) transforms the analysis into "fixed location is as half vs. half", in any event together with prevalent (matzui) we append also the majority. The Shach wrote similarly in Yoreh Deah (Siftei Kohen #23 on Shulchan Arukh Yoreh De'ah 110.4 ), see there in the Shach OBM 8In the case of meat purchased (as opposed to being found in the street) from one of ten stores, where 9 sell kosher meat, and 1 sells non-kosher meat, and then this piece of doubtful meat was inadvertently mixed with other definitely kosher meat, the Shulchan Aruch writes that the mixture is permissible by reason of double doubt: There is one doubt that any piece of meat in the mixture is from the definitely kosher meat or the doubtful purchased meat, and a second doubt that even if it was from the purchased meat, perhaps the purchased meat itself was actually purchased from a kosher shop and is kosher. The Acharonim comment that it should be considered as a single doubt because the purchased meat is forbidden by the "fixed location" (kavua) rule, and the Rama says that after applying the law of "fixed location", the purchased meat becomes Biblically forbidden, since "fixed location" is a Torah derived rule. Shach explains that the "fixed location" rule is a novelty, and therefore only applies when it is the sole consideration. However, it cannot be used when there are other doubts to be considered, and therefore once we cancel out the "fixed location" rule, we view the purchased meat as coming from one of the 10 stores, 90% of which sell kosher meat, and the rule of double doubt can apply.. And even though the rule of a double doubt does not apply where one doubt is in the body of the item itself (e.g. whether the purchased meat is kosher or not) and one (the second) doubt is with respect to the admixture, because the first doubt is forbidden by Torah law (by application of the "fixed location" / kavua rule), (the Shach responds) that the law of "fixed location" is a novel rule, for in all cases we (would otherwise) follow the majority, as the Ran wrote. (Therefore) you cannot apply "fixed location" except in its specific case, which is when it is applied by itself, and not when it has been mixed (with other permitted items), see there. Similarly here, even though the majority (of blood being in the uterus) by itself is not helpful because we apply the rule of "fixed location is as half vs. half", (but) since ("fixed location") is a novel law, it (the majority of blood) combines with the prevalent principle (matzui) to overrule proximity (karov). The gist of Rava's proof is that (the impurity) is not because of the majority of blood (being in the uterus) as per Abaye's reasoning, but rather because of prevalent (matzui), and prevalent is joined by the majority of blood (to overrule proximity) even though there is a potential (conflicting) application of the "fixed location" rule, as I have written above.

  4. 4

    ובזה יתיישב הסוגיא שם, דאמר רבא ש"מ מדר' חייא תלת, ש"מ רוב וקרוב הולכין אחר הרוב, וש"מ רובא דאורייתא, וש"מ איתיה לדר' זירא כו', והא רבא הוא דאמר רוב ומצוי ליכא למ"ד, הדר ביה רבא מהאי, וכתבו תוס' שם ז"ל ש"מ רובא דאורייתא חשיב ליה רובא דליתיה קמן, דברובא דאיתיה קמן לא צריך, דקרא כתיב אחרי רבים להטות ע"ש ואיכא למידק דהיכי מוכח מדר' חייא רובא דליתיה קמן, כיון דדמי החדר מרובין מדמי עליה ודאי הו"ל רובא דאיתיה קמן.

    With this the discussion there (Bava Batra.24b) is explained. Rava stated, we can make three conclusions from R. Hiyya's teaching: 1) in cases of majority (rov) conflicting with proximity (karov), we rule according to the majority. 2) Majority (rov) is a Biblical rule. 3) We follow the ruling of R. Zera 9R. Zera's ruling is discussed in the gemara on BB 24a.. The talmud asks, but wasn't Rava the one who said that (the case of blood found in the corridor) was a case of majority and prevalent, with which no one argues (that the combination is more potent than proximity)? The talmud answers, Rava retracted from that statement (and concludes that even majority alone, without prevalent, is more potent than proximity). Tosafot there (Tosafot on Bava Batra 24a:5, lead words Ruba d'oraita) regarding "majority" is a Biblical rule, this refers to a majority which is not in front of us 10"Ruba d'leta kaman" is most easily explained as a majority which is not actually counted, but is assumed as common knowledge. In this case, as explained by the author in paragraph 5 below, the fact that bleeding occurs more commonly from the uterus than the "attic" is an assumed majority rather than a counted majority. In some places, this seems to be described as a form of chazaka, a strong assumption. For with respect to a majority which is in front of us 11"Ruba d'ita kaman", a majority which is actually counted, e.g. 36 out of 71 judges in the Great Sanhedrin, or 9 out of 10 butcher shops selling kosher meat. we have no need (of proof from R. Hiyya), for it is an explicit verse, "you shall favor the majority" (Exodus.23.2) 12This is a more literal translation. The Koren and JPS translations are modified to follow one of the rabbinic interpretations, but our author is using the literal translation to support his argument.. It is possible to ask how is it proven from R. Hiyya regarding a majority that is not in front of us, since the blood of the uterus is (obviously) more copious than the blood of the attic, and this would definitely be considered a majority that is in front of us?

  5. 5

    ולפי מ"ש נראה דבתר דהדר רבא מסברא זו דרוב ומצוי ליכא למאן דאמר סבירא ליה דאפילו ברוב ומצוי אי נימא דקרוב עדיף מרוב לחודיה עדיף נמי מרוב ומצוי, וא"כ שפיר הוכיח מרבי חייא דרוב וקרוב הלך אחר הרוב, אלא לס"ל דרובא דמקור אינו משום רוב דמים, דכיון דר' חייא ע"כ בדארגשה הו"ל כפירש לפנינו דהו"ל כמחצה על מחצה, ואין הרוב משום דמצוי יותר לזוב מן המקור, וזה הו"ל רובא דליתיה קמן דהו"ל כמו רוב בהמות אינן טריפות וכיוצא מהנך רובא דליתא קמן, ודוק.

    According to what I have written above, it seems that after Rava retracted from this interpretation (of the mishna in Niddah, discussed in the gemara on Bava Batra 23b) that "no one disagrees that the combination of majority (rov) and prevalent (matzui) is more powerful than proximity (karov)", he (instead) thought that even in a case with combined majority and prevalent, if we were to hold that proximity is more powerful than majority alone, then (proximity would also) be more powerful than the combination of majority and prevalent. If so, then it is possible to prove from R. Hiyya's statement that in cases of majority vs. proximity, we follow the majority, except that the majority here is not the majority of blood in the uterus (as understood by Abaye), for since R. Hiyya's statement perforce deals with a case where the woman felt her blood flood start, it is as if it separated in front of us, which converts to a case of (any "fixed location" is) as half and half, rather13there is a typo here in the Sefaria hebrew text, it should say אלא הרוב, as seen in Shmat'ta Mevueret edition. The text as written does not make sense.) is because bleeding more commonly occurs from the uterus (than from the attic), and this is a majority which is not in front of us, similar to other majorities of this kind, such as "most animals are not treifot" and other similar cases of a majority which is not in front of us.

Hebrew: Shev Shmatta · Public Domain

English: Sefaria Community Translation · CC0

Texts from Sefaria.