And from this you will see how many people err in these things [to the extent] that if something is stolen from them, and they suspect someone, they tell the city dignitaries that they have "indications" against him, and they "beat and punish" not in accordance with the din to make him confess. And, in truth, this is not in accordance with the din. For if "indications" were like proof to the act [of theft] itself (and the city dignitaries are considered like beth-din), would they not have to know first that it [the object] were stolen? Would witnesses to the "indications" not be required, or they themselves have to see [the "indications"]? (as in the story of Mar Zutra, viz. Sanhedrin 46a), but not rely on the claimant and smite a Jew in vain! And even only to believe the claimant in their heart that this man stole from him is forbidden because of acceptance of lashon hara. How much more so, to rely upon this and to beat him, whereby they perform a great issur and transgress the negative commandment of "He shall not [smite] more!" (Devarim 25:3).
וּמִזֶּה תִּרְאֶה, כַּמָּה אֲנָשִׁים טוֹעִין בְּעִנְיָנִים אֵלּוּ, שֶׁאִם נִגְנָב לָהֶם חֵפֶץ, וְיֵשׁ לָהֶם עַל אֶחָד חֲשָׁד, אוֹמְרִים לְטוֹבֵי הָעִיר, שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶם עַל אֶחָד דְּבָרִים הַנִּכָּרִים, וְהֵם מַכִּים וְעוֹנְשִׁין, שֶׁלֹּא מִן הַדִּין, כְּדֵי שֶׁיּוֹדֶה. וּבֶאֱמֶת הוּא שֶׁלֹּא כַּדִּין, דְּלוּ יְהֵא דִּדְבָרִים הַנִּכָּרִים הוּא כְּמוֹ רְאָיָה לְעֶצֶם הַמַּעֲשֶׂה, וְטוֹבֵי הָעִיר חֲשִׁיבֵי כְּמוֹ בֵּית דִּין, הֲלֹא צָרִיךְ, שֶׁיֵּדְעוּ מִתְּחִלָּה שֶׁנִּגְנַב, וְגַם עֵדִים לְהַדְּבָרִים הַנִּכָּרִים, אוֹ שֶׁהֵם בְּעַצְמָם יִרְאוּ (כְּמוֹ בְּמַעֲשֶׂה דְּמַר זוּטְרָא), אֲבָל לֹא לִסְמֹךְ עַל הַתּוֹבֵעַ וּלְהַכּוֹת אֶת יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּחִנָּם. וַאֲפִלּוּ רַק לְהַאֲמִין לַתּוֹבֵעַ בַּלֵּב, שֶׁאִישׁ זֶה גָּנַב מֵאִתּוֹ, אָסוּר מִפְּנִי קַבָּלַת לָשׁוֹן הָרָע, וְעַל אַחַת כַּמָּה וְכַמָּה לִסְמֹךָ עַל זֶה וּלְהַכּוֹתוֹ, דְּאִסוּר גָּדוֹל עוֹשִׂים בָּזֶה, וְעוֹבְרִים עַל לָאו דְּ"לֹא יוֹסִיף".
And from this you will see how many people err in these things [to the extent] that if something is stolen from them, and they suspect someone, they tell the city dignitaries that they have "indications" against him, and they "beat and punish" not in accordance with the din to make him confess. And, in truth, this is not in accordance with the din. For if "indications" were like proof to the act [of theft] itself (and the city dignitaries are considered like beth-din), would they not have to know first that it [the object] were stolen? Would witnesses to the "indications" not be required, or they themselves have to see [the "indications"]? (as in the story of Mar Zutra, viz. Sanhedrin 46a), but not rely on the claimant and smite a Jew in vain! And even only to believe the claimant in their heart that this man stole from him is forbidden because of acceptance of lashon hara. How much more so, to rely upon this and to beat him, whereby they perform a great issur and transgress the negative commandment of "He shall not [smite] more!" (Devarim 25:3).