And now we shall begin to explain, with the help of the L–rd, the din of accepting lashon hara from a man who is believed like two witnesses, or from someone speaking "in his innocence," or if there are elements in what is said which indicate it to be true. And though in most of their dinim they are alike, I have divided each one into sections by themselves, for there are several details in which each one is different from the other, and also so that the eyes of the reader not be overtaxed by the abundance of branches which spread from each one. And this I have begun with the help of Him who graces man with knowledge.
The issur of lashon hara obtains even if it is heard from one who is believed [to the hearer] like two witnesses. As to what we have written above, in Principle IV, section 5, that it is permitted to reveal the matter secretly to his Rabbi or to his close confidant if he knows that his words will be believed like those of two witnesses, and that it is permitted for his Rabbi to accept his words and to hate him [the object of the lashon hara], and to distance himself from his company, until it becomes known to him that he has repented of his evil way — that is there, where it is a thing because of which he is, in truth, permitted to speak demeaningly of him if he has not repented, since he knowingly transgressed something which is known by all of Israel to be forbidden, in which instance no merit is to be posited of him (as in the act of Toviyah in Pesachim, 113b, which is an act of fornication, and the like). Not so, where it is a thing where some merit is to be posited of him, such as lacking knowledge of the issur of the act, or, perhaps, having performed the act unwittingly. Nor [is it permitted] to speak of him demeaningly in general, or as lacking in advantages, as mentioned before in Principle V, section 2, or to bring up the [negative] acts of his forbears or his relatives, or his early [negative] deeds. Certainly, "being believed like two" does not apply in these instances. For what difference does it make if this [i.e., what is said about him in these instances] is not false at all? In spite of this, the Torah forbade speaking of him demeaningly because of this, but [legislated] to judge him only in the scales of merit in such things, as explained in Principle IV, section 3.
And the hearer [as well as the speaker] is also forbidden to think demeaningly of his friend in his heart because of this (viz. Principle VI, section 7). And aside from the issur of accepting [the lashon hara], he transgresses "Before the blind man do not place a stumbling- block," along with many other positive and negative commandments, as explained above in the introduction. For the speaker certainly transgresses the issur of lashon hara, as explained by all the poskim, to the effect that lashon hara is forbidden even if true, and he [the accepter] brings him [the speaker] to this issur. For if he refused to listen, his friend [the speaker] would not arrive at this issur at all. And the more the words of the speaker are accepted and his [the speaker's] act is effectual, to that extent the accepter's act is more severe, for through him his friend is brought to such a great issur.
וְעַתָּה נַתְחִיל לְבָאֵר בְּעֶזְרַת ה' דִּין קַבָּלַת לָשׁוֹן הָרָע מֵאִישׁ, שֶׁהוּא מְהֵימָן כְּבֵי תְּרֵי {כשני עדים}, אוֹ מִמֵּסִיחַ לְפִי תֻּמּוֹ, אוֹ אִם יֵשׁ לוֹ עַל הַסִפּוּר הַהוּא דְּבָרִים הַנִּכָּרִים שֶׁהוּא אֱמֶת, וְאַף שֶׁבְּרֹב הַדִּינִים הֵם שָׁוִין, אַף עַל פִּי כֵן חִלַּקְּתִּי אוֹתָם כָּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד בִּסְעִיפִין בִּפְנִי עַצְּמָן, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁיֵּשׁ פְּרָטִים אֲחָדִים, שֶׁמִּשְׁתַּנְּה כָּל אֶחָד בְּדִינוֹ מֵחֲבֵרוֹ, וְגַם שֶׁלֹּא יִתְעַרְבְּבוּ עֵינִי הַקּוֹרֵא מִפְּנִי רֻבֵּי הָעֲנָפִים, שֶׁמִּתְפַּשְּׁטִים מִכָּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד. וְזֶה הֵחֵלִי בְּעֶזְרַת החוֹנִן לְאָדָם דַּעַת.
And now we shall begin to explain, with the help of the L–rd, the din of accepting lashon hara from a man who is believed like two witnesses, or from someone speaking "in his innocence," or if there are elements in what is said which indicate it to be true. And though in most of their dinim they are alike, I have divided each one into sections by themselves, for there are several details in which each one is different from the other, and also so that the eyes of the reader not be overtaxed by the abundance of branches which spread from each one. And this I have begun with the help of Him who graces man with knowledge.
אִסּוּר קַבָּלַת לָשׁוֹן הָרָע הוּא אֲפִלּוּ אִם שָׁמַע מֵאִישׁ, שֶׁהוּא מְהֵימָן לֵה כְּדִבְרֵי שְׁנֵי עֵדִים, וּמַה שֶּׁכָּתַבְנוּ לְעֵיל בִּכְלָל ד' סָעִיף ה', דְּמֻתָּר לְגַלּוֹת הָעִנְיָן בְּהַצְּנִעַ לְרבּוֹ וּלְאִישׁ סוֹדוֹ, אִם יֵדַע, אֲשֶׁר יאֲמִין דְּבָרָיו כְּדִבְרֵי שְׁנִי עֵדִים, וּמֻתָּר לְרַבּוֹ לְקַבֵּל דָּבָר זֶה וְלִשְׂנֹא אוֹתוֹ וּלְהִתְרַחֵק מֵחֶבְרָתוֹ, עַד אֲשֶׁר יִוָּדַע לוֹ, שֶׁשָּׁב מִדַּרְכּוֹ הָרָעָה, הַיְנוּ שָׁם, שֶׁהוּא דָּבָר אֲשֶׁר לְפִי הָאֱמֶת מֻתָּר לְסַפֵּר בִּגְנוּתוֹ עֲבוּר זֶה, אִם לֹא עָשָׂה תְּשׁוּבָה, כֵּיוָן שֶׁעָבַר בְּמֵזִיד עַל עֲוֹן דָּבָר הַמְפֻרְסָם בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל, שֶׁהוּא אָסוּר, שֶׁאֵין לִתְלוֹת עָלָיו עוֹד שׁוּם זְכוּת, (כְּגוֹן, (יב) בְּמַעֲשֵׂה דְּטוּבִיָּה בִּפְסָחִים, {קי"ג} שֶׁהוּא עִנְיַן נֵאוּף וְכַיּוֹצֵּא בָּזֶה), לֹא כֵן (יג) בְּדָבָר, שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִתְלוֹת עָלָיו זְכוּת, כְּגוֹן בְּחֶסְרוֹן יְדִיעַת אִסוּר הַמַּעֲשֶׂה, אוֹ אוּלַי בִּשְׁגָגָה בָּא לְיָדוֹ, אוֹ לְספֵּר עָלָיו דִּבְרֵי דֹּפִי וּגְנַאי בְּעָלְמָא, אוֹ בְּעִנְיַן שְׁלִילַת הַמַּעֲלוֹת, וְכַנּ"ל בִּכְלָל ה' סָעִיף ב', אוֹ לִזְכֹּר עָלָיו מַּעֲשֵׂי אֲבוֹתָיו וּקְרוֹבָיו, אוֹ מַעֲשָׂיו הָרִאשׁוֹנִים, בְּוַדַּאי לֹא שַׁיָּךְ בָּזֶה מְהֵימָן כְּבֵי תְּרֵי {נאמן כשני עדים}, דְּמַאי הֱוֵי {שֶׁמּה יִּהיִה}, אִם הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה אֵינוֹ שֶׁקֶּר מֵעִקָּרוֹ, אַף עַל פִּי כֵן אָסְרָה הַתּוֹרָה לְהַמְסַפֵּר לְסַפֵּר בִּגְנוּתוֹ עֲבוּר זֶה, רַק לְדוּנוֹ לְצֶּדֶק בָּעִנְיָן הַזֶּה וְכַנַּ"ל בִּכְלָל ד' סָעִיף ג'.
The issur of lashon hara obtains even if it is heard from one who is believed [to the hearer] like two witnesses. As to what we have written above, in Principle IV, section 5, that it is permitted to reveal the matter secretly to his Rabbi or to his close confidant if he knows that his words will be believed like those of two witnesses, and that it is permitted for his Rabbi to accept his words and to hate him [the object of the lashon hara], and to distance himself from his company, until it becomes known to him that he has repented of his evil way — that is there, where it is a thing because of which he is, in truth, permitted to speak demeaningly of him if he has not repented, since he knowingly transgressed something which is known by all of Israel to be forbidden, in which instance no merit is to be posited of him (as in the act of Toviyah in Pesachim, 113b, which is an act of fornication, and the like). Not so, where it is a thing where some merit is to be posited of him, such as lacking knowledge of the issur of the act, or, perhaps, having performed the act unwittingly. Nor [is it permitted] to speak of him demeaningly in general, or as lacking in advantages, as mentioned before in Principle V, section 2, or to bring up the [negative] acts of his forbears or his relatives, or his early [negative] deeds. Certainly, "being believed like two" does not apply in these instances. For what difference does it make if this [i.e., what is said about him in these instances] is not false at all? In spite of this, the Torah forbade speaking of him demeaningly because of this, but [legislated] to judge him only in the scales of merit in such things, as explained in Principle IV, section 3.
וּלְהַמְקַבֵּל גַּם כֵּן אָסוּר לְהַחְלִיט בְּלִבּוֹ אֶת חֲבֵרוֹ לִגְנוּת עֲבוּר זֶה, וְכַנַּ"ל בִּכְלָל ו' סָעִיף ז', (וּמִלְּבַד אִסוּר הַקַּבָּלָה עוֹבֵר עַל לָאו דְּ"לִפְנֵי עִוֵּר לֹא תִתֵּן מִכְשׁוֹל" עִם כַּמָּה עֲשִׂין וְלָאוִין הַמְבֹאָרִין לְעֵיל בַּפְּתִיחָה, כֵּיוָן שֶׁהַמְסַפֵּר בְּוַדַּאי עוֹבֵר עַל אִסוּר לָשׁוֹן הָרָע, כַּמְבֹאָר בְּכָל הַפּוֹסְקִים, דְּלָשׁוֹן הָרָע הוּא אֲפִלּוּ עַל אֱמֶת, וְהוּא בִּשְׁמִיעָתוֹ הֱבִיאוֹ לְאִסוּר זֶה, דְּאִלּוּ לֹא הָיָה רוֹצֶה לִשְׁמֹעַ מֵאִתּוֹ, לֹא הָיָה חֲבֵרוֹ בָּא לִכְלַל אִסוּר, וְכָל שֶׁיִּתְקַבֵּל יוֹתֵר לְפָנָיו דִּבְרֵי הַמְסַפֵּר וְיִהְיֶה אֲהַנּוּ מַעֲשָׂיו, יִהְיֶה יוֹתֵר גָּרוּעַ לְהַמְקַבֵּל גַּם כֵּן, שֶׁעַל יָדוֹ בָּא חֲבֵרוֹ לְאִסוּר גָּדוֹל כָּזֶה).
And the hearer [as well as the speaker] is also forbidden to think demeaningly of his friend in his heart because of this (viz. Principle VI, section 7). And aside from the issur of accepting [the lashon hara], he transgresses "Before the blind man do not place a stumbling- block," along with many other positive and negative commandments, as explained above in the introduction. For the speaker certainly transgresses the issur of lashon hara, as explained by all the poskim, to the effect that lashon hara is forbidden even if true, and he [the accepter] brings him [the speaker] to this issur. For if he refused to listen, his friend [the speaker] would not arrive at this issur at all. And the more the words of the speaker are accepted and his [the speaker's] act is effectual, to that extent the accepter's act is more severe, for through him his friend is brought to such a great issur.