Even on hearing lashon hara alone there is an issur according to the Torah (even if at the time of hearing he does not intend to accept what is said), since he inclines his ear tohear. But there is a difference between hearing and accepting in several respects. For in hearing [alone, without accepting], there is no issur only when what is said does not affect him in the future. But if it does if true, as when he understands from the beginning of what he says that he wishes to show that the one spoken about is not to be trusted, and the like — if, originally, he [the hearer] intended to take him into his business or to enter into partnership with him or to make a match with him, and the like, he is permitted ab initio to listen and to suspect [that it might be true], so that he can guard himself against him. [This is permitted] since his intent is not to listen to the demeaning of his friend, but to guard himself against future injury or strife and contention and the like. The same applies when he derives no personal benefit from what is said; but if by his listening, some benefit may result for others, it is also permitted. As when he wishes to hear this thing in order to find out afterwards if it is true and to reprove him [who is spoken about] for this. Perhaps this will result in the sinner's repenting, or in returning the theft to its owners, or to appease the one he "insulted and blasphemed," and the like, in which instance it is permitted. But to accept it — that is, to believe in his heart that it is true — is forbidden in all instances.
אַף עַל (ב) שְׁמִיעַת לָשׁוֹן הָרָע לְבַד גַּם כֵּן יֵשׁ אִסוּר מִן הַתּוֹרָה, אַף דִּבְעֵת הַשְּׁמִיעָה אֵין בְּדַעְתּוֹ לְקַבֵּל אֶת הַדָּבָר, כֵּיוָן שֶׁמַּטֶּה אָזְנָיו לִשְׁמֹעַ. אַךְ יֵשׁ חִלּוּק בֵּין שְׁמִיעָה לְקַבָּלָה בְּכַמָּה עִנְיָנִים, דְּבִשְׁמִיעָה אֵין אִסוּר, רַק אִם אֵין הַדָּבָר נוֹגֵעַ לוֹ עַל לְהַבָּא, אֲבָל אִם הַדָּבָר נוֹגֵעַ לוֹ עַל לְהַבָּא, אִם אֱמֶת הוּא, כְּגוֹן שֶׁהוּא מֵבִין מִתְּחִלַּת הַסִּפּוּר, שֶׁהוּא רוֹצֶּה לְהַרְאוֹתוֹ בְּסִפּוּרוֹ, אֵיךְ שֶׁפְּלוֹנִי אֵינוֹ אִישׁ מְהֵימָן וּכְהַאי גַּוְנָא, וְהָיָה בְּדַעְתּוֹ מִתְּחִלָּה לְהַכְנִיסוֹ בְּעִסְקוֹ אוֹ לְהִשְׁתַּתֵּף עִמּוֹ אוֹ לַעֲשׂוֹת שִׁדּוּךְ עִמּוֹ וְכָל כְּהַאי גַּוְנָא, (ג) מֻתָּר לְכַתְּחִלָּה לִשְׁמֹעַ כְּדֵי לָחוּשׁ לָזֶה וּלְהִשָּׁמֵר מִמֶּנּוּ, כֵּיוָן דְּמַה שֶּׁהוּא רוֹצֶה לִשְׁמֹעַ, אֵין כַּוָּנָתוֹ לִשְׁמֹעַ גְּנוּתוֹ שֶל חֲבֵרוֹ, רַק הוּא רוֹצֶה לְהַצִּיל אֶת עַצְמוֹ, כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יָבוֹא אַחַר כָּךְ לִידֵי הֶזֵּק אוֹ לִידֵי מַצָּה וּמְרִיבָה וּכְהַאי גַּוְנָא. וְהוּא הַדִּין הֵיכָא, דְּאֵין נוֹגֵעַ לוֹ שׁוּם טוֹבָה מֵהַשְּׁמִיעָה, רַק עַל יְדֵי שְׁמִיעָתוֹ יְסֻבַּב טוֹבָה לַאֲחֵרִים, גַּם כֵּן מֻתָּר, כְּגוֹן, שֶׁרוֹצֶּה לִשְׁמֹעַ דָּבָר זֶה (ד) כְּדֵי לַחֲקֹר אַחַר כָּךְ, אִם אֱמֶת הוּא, וּלְהוֹכִיחַ לִפְלוֹנִי עַל זֶה, וְאוּלַי עַל יְדֵי זֶה יִהְיֶה סִבָּה, שֶׁיָּשׁוּב הַחוֹטֵא מֵּחֶטְאוֹ אוֹ שֶׁיָּשִׁיב אֶת הַגְּזֵלָה לִבְעָלָיו אוֹ שֶׁיְּפַיֵּס לְמִי שֶׁחֵרֵף וְגִדֵּף וְכַיּוֹצֵּא בָּזֶה, דְּמֻתָּר, וְהַטַּעַם כַּנַּ"ל. אֲבָל לְקַבֵּל, דְּהַיְנוּ, לְהַחְלִיט הַדָּבָר בְּלִבּוֹ, שֶׁהוּא אֱמֶת, (ה) אָסוּר בְּכָל גַּוְנֵי.
Even on hearing lashon hara alone there is an issur according to the Torah (even if at the time of hearing he does not intend to accept what is said), since he inclines his ear tohear. But there is a difference between hearing and accepting in several respects. For in hearing [alone, without accepting], there is no issur only when what is said does not affect him in the future. But if it does if true, as when he understands from the beginning of what he says that he wishes to show that the one spoken about is not to be trusted, and the like — if, originally, he [the hearer] intended to take him into his business or to enter into partnership with him or to make a match with him, and the like, he is permitted ab initio to listen and to suspect [that it might be true], so that he can guard himself against him. [This is permitted] since his intent is not to listen to the demeaning of his friend, but to guard himself against future injury or strife and contention and the like. The same applies when he derives no personal benefit from what is said; but if by his listening, some benefit may result for others, it is also permitted. As when he wishes to hear this thing in order to find out afterwards if it is true and to reprove him [who is spoken about] for this. Perhaps this will result in the sinner's repenting, or in returning the theft to its owners, or to appease the one he "insulted and blasphemed," and the like, in which instance it is permitted. But to accept it — that is, to believe in his heart that it is true — is forbidden in all instances.