And even our heter [to repeat this to another] where there is no intent to publicize it, applies only to the first hearer, who himself heard what Reuven said about Shimon in the presence of three. But he who heard it from him is forbidden to go thereafter, on the authority of his having been told that he heard it in the presence of three, and to tell another of the taint he heard attributed to Shimon, even if he does not mention who it is that purveyed this slander against Shimon — unless the thing were publicized and became known to all. And this applies not only when this second hearer does not himself know whether the allegation itself — that Reuven slandered Shimon — is true, in which instance he certainly is forbidden to believe him [his informer] that Reuven transgressed the issur of lashon hara. But even if he knows himself that Reuven spoke demeaningly of Shimon, but he does not know if he did so in the presence of three, in spite of this, he is forbidden to rely on his words to this effect, and we fear that perhaps it was not in the presence of three and that it is not bound to become public knowledge, wherefore he [the second hearer] is forbidden to tell it to anyone.
וַאֲפִלּוּ מַה שֶּׁהִתַּרְנוּ בְּאִם אֵינוֹ מִתְכַּוֵּן לְגַלּוֹת, (ט) דַּוְקָא הַשּׁוֹמֵעַ הָרִאשׁוֹן, שֶׁשָּׁמַע בְּעַצְּמוֹ מַה שֶּׁרְאוּבֵן סִפֵּר עַל שִׁמְעוֹן בְּאַפֵּי תְּלָתָא {בפני שלשה}, אֲבָל מִי שֶׁשָּׁמַע מִמֶּנוּ, אָסוּר לֵילֵךְ אַחַר כָּךְ עַל סְמָךְ הַזֶּה, שֶׁאָמַר לוֹ הַמְסַפֵּר לוֹ, שֶׁשָּׁמַע דָּבָר זֶה בְּאַפֵּי תְּלָתָא, וּלְסַפֵּר לְאַחֵר מֵהַגְּנוּת שֶׁשָּׁמַע עַל שִׁמְעוֹן, אַף אִם לֹא יַזְכִּיר מִי הוּא הַמּוֹצִּיא וְהַמֵּבִיא הַלַּעַז הַזֶּה עַל שִׁמְעוֹן, אִם לֹא (י) שֶׁכְּבָר נִתְפַּרְסֵם הַדָּבָר וְנוֹדַע לַכֹּל. וְלָא מִבָּעֵי {ואין צריך לומר} אִם הַשּׁוֹמֵעַ הַשֵּׁנִי הַזֶּה אֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ כְּלָל מֵעַצְמוֹ אֶת עֶצֶם הַמַּעֲשֶׂה, אִם הוּא אֱמֶת שֶׁרְאוּבֵן סִפֵּר גְּנוּת עַל שִׁמְּעוֹן, (יא) בְּוַדַּאי אֵין לוֹ לְהַאֲמִינוֹ, בְּזֶה שֶׁרְאוּבֵן עָבַר עַל אִסוּר לָשׁוֹן הָרָע, אֶלָּא אֲפִלּוּ אִם הוּא יוֹדֵעַ בְּעַצְּמוֹ, שֶׁרְאוּבֵן סִפֵּר גְּנוּת עַל שִׁמְעוֹן, אַךְ אֵינֶנּוּ יוֹדֵע אִם הָיָה בְּאַפֵּי תְּלָתָא, וְהַשּׁוֹמֵעַ הָרִאשׁוֹן הַזֶּה גִּלָּה לוֹ שֶׁהָיָה בְּאַפֵּי תְּלָתָא, אַף עַל פִּי כֵן אָסוּר לוֹ לִסְמֹךְ עַל דְּבָרָיו בָּזֶה וְחָיְשִׁינַן דִּילְמָא לֹא הָיָה זֶה בְּאַפֵּי תְּלָתָא, וְאֵינֶנוּ עָשׂוּי לְהִתְגַּלּוֹת, וְעַל כֵּן אָסוּר לָזֶה לְסַפֵּר לְשׁוּם אָדָם.
And even our heter [to repeat this to another] where there is no intent to publicize it, applies only to the first hearer, who himself heard what Reuven said about Shimon in the presence of three. But he who heard it from him is forbidden to go thereafter, on the authority of his having been told that he heard it in the presence of three, and to tell another of the taint he heard attributed to Shimon, even if he does not mention who it is that purveyed this slander against Shimon — unless the thing were publicized and became known to all. And this applies not only when this second hearer does not himself know whether the allegation itself — that Reuven slandered Shimon — is true, in which instance he certainly is forbidden to believe him [his informer] that Reuven transgressed the issur of lashon hara. But even if he knows himself that Reuven spoke demeaningly of Shimon, but he does not know if he did so in the presence of three, in spite of this, he is forbidden to rely on his words to this effect, and we fear that perhaps it was not in the presence of three and that it is not bound to become public knowledge, wherefore he [the second hearer] is forbidden to tell it to anyone.